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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided Friedman v.
Rogers, a case involving a First Amendment challenge to a Texas statute that prohibited optometrists from practicing under an assumed
trade name.1 Although an important case, Friedmancertainly is not
one of the major milestones of First Amendment jurisprudence. Prior
Supreme Court decisions established that although commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment, government may regulate speech to prevent deception or confusion.2 Because a majority in
Friedmanfound a possibility of deception, the Court held that Texas
could constitutionally prohibit the use of a trade name.
Friedman becomes much more interesting if one considers what
the Court is saying about trade emblems. 3 The Court did not simply
find that the particular trade name used by the optometrist was mis1. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). The provision in question, the Texas Optometry Act § 5.13(d), allowed an optometrist to practice using the personal name
under which he had been licensed. The Act further allowed partnerships of optometrists to practice using names comprising some of the partners. All other
forms of trade names were prohibited.
2. The leading pre-Friedmancases include Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977), and Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
3. This Article uses the term "trade emblem" to refer to any word or symbol that a
seller employs to identify the seller or the seller's products to shoppers. The term
therefore includes trademarks, service marks, collective marks, and certification
marks, all of which identify the source of a good or service offered for sale in the
marketplace. It also includes "trade names," the name by which a firm identifies
itself. The term, however, does not include "product names," the names of goods
and services. Although the analysis employed in this Article will sometimes apply to product names, see, e.g., infra note 107, product names present enough
unique considerations to warrant separate treatment.
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leading.4 Instead, it held that all trade names have an inherent ca-

pacity to deceive. 5 Texas could therefore enact a blanket ban on all
trade names without having to demonstrate whether a particular
name might be misleading.
The suggestion that all trade emblems are potentially deceptive
clashes with a basic precept of intellectual property law: trade names
and other trade emblems help to reduce confusion in the marketplace.
Admittedly, trade emblems often are used as instruments of deception. Case reports are filled with situations in which one company
uses a competitor's trademark or trade name to pass off its goods to
unsuspecting buyers. The current legal rules, however, are designed
to prevent, not foster, this sort of deception. A party with a protected
trade name can utilize the courts to thwart any impostors. By denying optometrists their ability to use trade names, the Texas statute
may have removed a very important control, thereby resulting in
more, rather than less, deception.6
Deception is a failure of communication. And communication ordinarily is carried out by means of language. When buyers and sellers
communicate in the market, they make extensive use of trade emblems as part of their language. A trade name is much more than a
simple identification badge that allows people to distinguish sellers.
It is instead an entire array of different messages, all condensed into a
single word, a short phrase, or a symbol. Those myriad messages comprise the definition of the trade emblem. A potential for purchaser
deception exists whenever any of these messages contain false information. What makes Friedmannoteworthy is the majority's recognition that even when a trade emblem correctly names the source of
7
goods or services, it can still contain false and deceptive information.
Acknowledging that trade emblems serve as "words" in the lexicon
of the market forces one to view the law governing trade emblems in
an entirely new light. Most attorneys perceive of trade emblem law as
4. This, however, would have been an easy way for the Court to dispose of the case.
The actual trade name used in the case, TEXAS STATE OPTICAL, could have
been interpreted as a representation that the stores either were run by the state
or ejoyed some special state imprimatur.
5. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979).
6. Indeed, Justice Blackmun argued in his separate opinion that because the statute might well result in more customer confusion, denying optomitrists the op-

portunity to use trade names could not be justified as a measure intended to
control deception. Id. at 25-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).

7. For example, the majority opinion notes that a trade name may convey price and
other information about the firm's product. Id at 11. Of course, the name
TEXAS STATE OPTICAL said nothing on its face about price or quality. The
majority nevertheless recognized that people who regularly deal with the company will eventually develop certain expectations concerning price and quality.
Such an imprecise means of communication was, in the majority's view, what
gave rise to the risk of deception. Id. at 11-13.
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occupying a distinct niche in the realm of intellectual property law.
Its closest jurisprudential cousins include copyright, patent, and misappropriation. Like these areas, the main concern in trade emblem
law is how to allocate the intellectual property rights among various
contenders.
Lumping trade emblem law with the other areas of intellectual
property law is nearsighted, however. The law of trade emblems actually forms part of the much broader and more difficult question of how
the law should interact with language. Although the law usually does
not purposefully interfere with language, exceptions exist. The most
common exception allows the law to interfere when speech is used to
deceive. The law of trade emblems is therefore merely one of several
means by which the law regulates the truth of language in the
marketplace.
Of course legislatures and courts frequently recite the mantra that
one of the main purposes of trade emblem law is to prevent consumer
deception. Governing statutes do contain certain rules that directly
serve this end.s In practice, however, this ideal tends to be overlooked. Most of the judicial and legislative debate focuses on defining
the rights of the sellers, not on the effect that various contending rules
will have on the efficiency and accuracy of communication in the
market. 9
The rules of trade emblem law need to be reevaluated to determine
whether they are effective rules of language. A language approach
suggests that the primary focus of the law should be the overall process of communication, not merely one of the communicating parties.
8. The legislative history of the Lanham Act explicitly indicates that one of the two

main purposes of the statute is to protect purchasers from deception. S. REP. No.
79-1333 (1946). This purpose manifests itself in various provisions of the statute.
See, e.g., the following sections of the Lanham Act: § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)
(1994)(refusing registration to "deceptive" marks); § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(1994)(creating a cause of action when someone uses a registered mark in a fashion that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"); and
§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994)(creating a cause of action when someone
makes any claim in advertising or promotion that is "likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive").
9. An excellent example of this phenomenon is the debate concerning whether purchasers can bring claims under Lanham Act § 43(a). As discussed in supra note

8, § 43(a) clearly deals with purchaser deception. Nothing on the face of the statute limits the provision to claims brought by competitors. Nevertheless, most
courts that have faced the question have refused to allow the purchaser's suit,

concluding that Congress intended the Lanham Act to protect only competitors.

Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Intl Corp., 11
F.3d 1163 (3rd Cir. 1993); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp.,
871 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1989); Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686 (2nd Cir.
1971). By refusing to allow the victims of deception to sue, the courts seem to

have overlooked their own mantra about how the Lanham Act was enacted to
control deception.
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The law should abandon its traditional "intellectual property" paradigm, which concentrates on allocating rights in creations, and should
substitute a paradigm with a core principle of preventing deception.
This new paradigm may, in turn, result in some changes in the governing law.
Part I of this Article addresses whether the basic principles of
trade emblem law make sense as rules of language. Although the new
perspective certainly requires a rethinking of the existing rules, Part I
demonstrates that most of the basic principles are valid as rules of
language. The linchpin of the entire system-the grant of exclusive
rights to one seller-will generally encourage efficient communication
and limit deception. Similarly, the rules of priority, registration, and
infringement serve these same ends.
Part H explores some of the more difficult questions of trade emblem law, such as dilution, reverse palming-off, and succession to
rights. It is here that a language-based analysis has the most to offer.
Much of the current confusion is created by legislatures and courts
that have not fully recognized that trade emblems convey several distinct messages. Recognizing the multiple messages in a trade emblem
makes it possible to take a reasoned approach to these difficult issues.
This reasoned approach, in turn, reveals significant flaws in the current rules.
Much of the discussion in this Article emphasizes United States
trademark law. The analysis is not limited to trademarks, however.
The principles of a language analysis fully apply to service, collective,
and certification marks, and in large part, to trade names. Further, a
language analysis is confined neither to the United States legal system nor the English language. It extends to all legal systems that
follow the basic model of providing exclusivity in trade emblems.1O
H. TRADE EMBLEMS AS LANGUAGE
A. How Trade Emblems Convey Information
A market can function effectively only if purchasers can make informed choices. Most purchasers are not armed a priori with perfect
knowledge about the goods and services that they are considering.
Purchasers must instead obtain that information by inspecting the
commodity and communicating with the potential seller or with third
parties."1 In most cases, it is quite costly for the purchaser either to
10. The Article's emphasis on United States trademark law is due to two practical
considerations: first, the Author's own familiarity with United States law, and
second, the law of trademarks is clearly the most highly developed area of trade
emblem law.
11. Purchasers are becoming increasingly reliant on communication to obtain needed
information. The traditional methods of deriving quality information-personal
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undertake a comprehensive inspection or to engage in an in-depth
conversation with the seller.12 The market can function more efficiently if sellers have a shorthand way of communicating the standard
information that purchasers need to make an informed choice. Trade
emblems constitute one of these shorthand methods.13
Trade emblems often are defined as words or symbols that identify
a particular seller.14 Identifying the seller is an important consideration and has been recognized by societies throughout history.15 Yet
identifying the seller is by no means the sole function of a trade emblem.' 6 Most shoppers in today's vast national economy do not know
personally the source of the myriad goods and services they purchase.
Therefore, most purchasers are not motivated by any sense of per-

12.

13.

14.

15.

inspection and questioning the seller-often are no longer as useful. Modern purchasers must select from a much wider array of products and services than were
available a generation ago. In addition, most products and many services are
becoming more complex. Moreover, products today are increasingly sold in packaging, making detailed inspection difficult or impossible. Finally, the increased
prevalence of large discount "chain" stores, which often hire clerks who know little about the myriad products sold in the store, makes it more difficult to derive
information from the seller itself. As a result, purchasers increasingly find that
they simply lack the knowledge needed to evaluate many goods and services.
ARmEN ALCHiAN & WnLim R. A=J N, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: CObN'ETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 193, 294-95 (2d ed. 1977); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN.
265, 269 (1987).
Trade emblems, however, are not the only method of communication. Many sellers rely on mass advertising campaigns to convey specific ideas to a large number
of potential purchasers. Purchaser-oriented magazines like Consumer Reports
are another means by which purchasers can acquire needed information.
A trade name is a term used to identify the seller itself. A trademark or service
mark, by contrast, identifies a particular commodity as originating from that
source. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). This Article will employ the
modern terms for product and firm names. The common law used different terminology, a fact that sometimes results in confusion. At common law, the terms
trade name and trademark both applied to goods. The difference between the two
is that while a trademark was automatically protected, a trade name could be
protected only with secondary meaning.
In ancient Egypt, for example, each brickmaker was required to stamp his product with a unique symbol. Likewise, members of the medieval guilds also marked
their products in unique ways, although they were not required to do so by law.
Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade.marks, 14
LAw & CoNTsAw. PROBs. 173, 173 (1949).

16. In fact, if the only concern was identifying the seller, the law would protect only
sellers who used their own personal or corporate names as trade emblems. Current trade emblem law, however, is void of any preferences for parties who use
their personal names. In fact, the Lanham Act expressly prohibits the registration of any trademark or service that is "primarily merely a surname." Lanham
Act § 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (1994). Courts apply a similar rule in infringement cases.
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sonal friendship with the companies that provide products.17 Instead,
the main motivations usually include the impersonal factors of price
and quality.
This does not mean that purchasers have no interest in knowing
the source of what they are buying. Their interest is more than mere
curiosity. Identifying the source of a product provides purchasers
with a great deal of other relevant information.18 First, such information reveals available recourse options should the product fail to perform as expected. Second, and more importantly, distinguishing
various sources helps shoppers choose among competing products. A
shopper may have had an experience, either good or bad, with the
goods or services of a particular seller. Absent additional information,
most shoppers assume that other products from that source will be of
like quality. Trade emblems provide a ready way to identify different
items that emanate from the same source, making it easy for the shopper to tap into this prior experience. Saying that a trade emblem identifies a "source" is really a shorthand way of saying that an emblem
conveys all information that purchasers may associate with a
source. 19
17. 1 JEnoME GESON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[3], at 1-23 to 124 (Jeffirey M. Samuels ed., 1996); 1 J. THoMAs McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEhImTS AND UNFAIR CoMI rON § 3.03[2], at 3-13 (3d ed. 1995); Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813
(1927). Also, in Celanese Corporationof America v. E.I. DuPontde Nemours &
Co., 154 F.2d 143 (Ct. Cust. App. 1946), the court held that defendant's mere
addition of "DuPont" to plaintiffs mark did not alleviate the likelihood of confusion. If knowing the source was all that mattered, however, the defendant should
have prevailed in this case.
Admittedly, for some products knowledge ofthe source is the consumer's main
criterion, especially when personal services are involved. Consumers often will
ignore considerations such as price or quality in the interest of doing business
with a friend or family member. In other cases, purchasers buy products or services because they agree with a seller's environmental or social policy. Other preferences simply defy cold logic. For example, this Author continues to root for the
Minnesota Twins baseball club even though the team exhibits little that can be
called quality under any objective criteria. But these cases are the exceptions,
not the rule. Most shoppers are more concerned with the nature of the good or
service than they are with the identity of the seller.
18. Of course, this Article is by no means the first to recognize that trade emblems do
more than merely identify source. The Supreme Court's analysis in Friedmanis
grounded in the notion that a trade name contains multiple messages. Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). Many other courts and commentators have discussed at length the various functions that trade emblems can perform. For a
sampling, see Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1993); GSON,
supra note 17, § 1.03[6], at 1-33; 1 McCAnR , supra note 17, § 3.03, at 3-3 to 321. Although many have recognized the various roles that trade emblems play in
market communication, few have explored the implications.
19. See Schechter, supra note 17, at 818-19.
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Trade emblems also may convey relevant information that has
nothing to do with the source. Many sellers borrow existing words as
marks. These words will have a literal meaning to shoppers who spot
them in the market. If shoppers connect the preexisting meaning to
the good or service, a trade emblem can operate as a form of informational advertising.
In essence, a trade emblem becomes part of the vocabulary of the
marketplace. A seller who coins a new word or symbol like XEROX or
KODAK adds a word to the vocabulary. A seller who adopts a recognized word or symbol, by contrast, modifies the definition of that term,
at least in the context of a certain good, service, or seller. Hence, trade
emblems allow sellers to express a number of complex ideas in a single
20
word, phrase, or symbol.
B. The Various Messages that a Trade Emblem May Convey
Although trade emblems become part of the market lexicon, they
are not the exclusive means by which sellers and shoppers communicate. Trade emblems cannot convey all of the information that shoppers need to make their decision. Determining how the law should
deal with trade emblems requires an understanding of the limits on
the types of information emblems can convey.
Basically, trade emblems can convey up to four distinct messages:
the denominative message, the associative message, the descriptive
messages, and the allusive message. Few trade emblems, however,
will actually convey all four of these messages. In addition, although
distinct, these messages are not entirely independent. Changes in the
2
content of one message may affect the strength or meaning of others. 1
Because each of the four messages can affect shoppers, each will be
discussed in depth.

20. This is not an uncommon occurrence in language. As cultures encounter new
concepts, they create new words to describe those concepts. F.R. PALMER,

SEMAN-

Tics 17-24 (2nd ed. 1981); Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 271-72. This phenomenon is essential to the way we view reality. Not all languages assign words
to the same concepts. If the language of a given culture does not have a word for
a concept, that concept may not be recognized in the world view of that culture.
Thus, language affects the way a culture perceives reality. ANNA WmiRZBICKA,
SEmnics, CuLTUR AND CoGNrrIoN 6-10 (1992); Albert Heinrich, Some Notes on
Central Eskimo Color Terminology, in LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL IssuEs 45 (William C. McCormack & Stephen A. Wurm eds., 1977).
21. For an example of how this may occur, see the discussion of "tarnishmene' in
section II.D.
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1. DenominativeMessage
22
Sellers use trade emblems to identify themselves to shoppers.
This function of trade emblems is widely known. 23 Nevertheless, it is
worthwhile to explore exactly what it means to "identify" a seller. A
trade emblem does not identify the source in the same fashion as, for
example, someone's signature on a birthday card. Instead of "identifying" the seller as someone personally known to the buyer, a trade emblem merely declares that the seller is a distinct entity that competes
in the market for a particular good or service.
Although impersonal, this form of identification is nevertheless important to shoppers. Most shoppers who spot a trade emblem will
make two significant assumptions. First, shoppers will assume that
similar products bearing the same emblem will exhibit some degree of
consistency because a single firm tends to produce goods and services
of roughly uniform quality. For example, a shopper who spots two cartons of milk bearing the same trade emblem will assume that both are
approximately the same. This consistency appeals to shoppers because the process of shopping becomes more predictable. Second,
shoppers will also assume that a good or service sold under a trade
emblem is of a certain minimum level of quality. Shoppers experience
a basic level of comfort in seeing a trade emblem on a product.
Moreover, shoppers assume that name brand goods and services
are generally of a higher quality than generics. 24 If the emblem remains in the market for some time, shoppers may assume a still
higher minimum level of quality, even if the shoppers have never tried
the product. Because sellers of low-quality products generally quickly

22. A trade name directly serves this purpose by giving shoppers a name by which to
refer to the seller. With a trademark or service mark, the identification is less
direct. BIG MAC is not the name of the seller; rather, it is a symbol that people
may come to associate with McDonald's.
23. 1 GiLSoN, supranote 17, § 1.03[1]; 1 McCARTY, supranote 17, § 3.01[3], at 3-5 to
3-7.
24. Marshall I. Goldman, Product Differentiation and Advertising: Some Lessons
from Soviet Experience, 68 J. PoL. EcoN. 346 (1960), discusses a Soviet study that
demonstrated that when goods were sold without any means of identifying the
seller, the quality would often decline. Rogers, supra note 15, at 175-76, argues
that this occurs because, if sellers cannot use trade emblems, the only way to
distinguish their goods from competitors is by price. If price is the only way to
distinguish products, purchasers will be interested in buying the cheapest of comparable goods. To keep price low, sellers have an incentive to cut costs, which can
result in lower quality. Other reasons may explain why shoppers assume that
branded products are of higher quality. For example, purchasers may reason
that a seller would remain anonymous unless it wanted to claim credit for the
products it sells.
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exit the market, a shopper who continues to see a mark may assume
that the product is satisfactory to some purchasers. 25
Of the four messages, only the denominative is conveyed in every
valid trade emblem. 2 6 Unlike the associative message, the denominative message does not depend on whether anyone has actually
purchased the goods or services. 27 Unlike the descriptive and allusive
messages, a trade emblem will send a denominative message regardless of the word, phrase, or symbol chosen for the emblem. Any emblem can denominate a seller as long as shoppers recognize that the
emblem is used as an indication of source. 28
2.

Associative Message

Shoppers rely on many sources of information when making
purchasing decisions. These sources include advertising and independent evaluations. Nevertheless, a shopper's own past experience with a particular seller usually is the most influential factor. 2 9 A
shopper who has had a bad experience with a particular seller's product will be unlikely to buy from that seller again. Conversely, it can be
quite difficult to convince a shopper who has had a very positive expe25. These assumptions need not be true. The fear that sellers might take advantage

26.

27.

28.

29.

of these assumptions is the basis for the Supreme Court's ruling in Friedman
that a trade name is inherently deceptive. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1979).
Although every trade emblem has the potential to denominate source, shoppers
may fail to interpret the emblem in that fashion. Because an emblem can send
multiple messages, shoppers often will let a message other than the denominative prevail. For discussion of one important example of this phenomenon-the
case of descriptive and generic marks-see infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
This does not mean that experience is irrelevant to the denominative message.
Shopper experience with a trade emblem can often create a denominative
message by allowing it to develop a "secondary meaning." See infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
Not all words and symbols are recognized as indications of source. In Western
PublishingCo. v. Rose Art Industries,Inc., 910 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1990), the court
indicated that the word GOLDEN was particularly ineffective in indicating
source because it was used by so many sellers. In one of the more curious cases
on this point, In re DiamondHill Farms, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383 (1994), the
court held that the company could not register its own name as a trademark for
potatoes it had grown. The reason was that the applicant had not used the mark
as a trademark, but instead as a phrase that distinguished its potatoes from
those of other growers. The court's distinction makes little sense because the
purpose of all trade emblems is to distinguish sellers.
Experience is influential because it is a quick, easy, and effective way to ascertain
quality. Admittedly it is not the most accurate method, as shoppers can use
source as a basis for judging quality only for previously used goods and services,
not for new goods that they may encounter. In addition, shoppers who use past
experiences to gauge present quality make a significant assumption that the
quality remains unchanged. Notwithstanding these limitations, relying on experience essentially is costless and makes it more efficient to judge quality than
either inspection or investigation.
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rience to buy from a different seller. Although experience is most influential when the shopper contemplates purchasing the same
product, experience may also be a factor when the shopper is considering a different product.3o Trade emblems make it possible for shoppers to tap into this experience. By providing a quick and relatively
sure way to distinguish sellers, trade emblems allow shoppers to sort
and categorize their own experiences and to recall the relevant experiences when they again venture into the market.31
The associative message of a particular trade emblem is the collection of the past experiences that a shopper associates with goods or
services sold under that trade emblem.32 The associative message is
the strongest of a trade emblem's four messages. Shoppers tend to
trust their own experience more than claims made by sellers in the
marketplace. Not all trade emblems convey an associative message,
however. Essentially, the associative message is entirely dependent
on the denominative. Unless shoppers can attribute their actual personal experiences to a particular seller, shoppers will be unable to use
that experience in deciding among competing commodities in the
market.
The associative message differs from the other three messages in
one important aspect. Because it depends on actual experience, it almost always will vary from shopper to shopper.33 Shoppers who have
never dealt with the emblem, or who have no memory of any dealings,
will not derive an associative message from the trade emblem. Even
shoppers familiar with the mark may have had varying experiences
with the commodity.
Purchasers who buy a product based on personal positive experience make an assumption that the product is approximately as good
as it was in the past. The associative message of the mark used on
30. It is increasingly common for a manufacturer of a successful branded product to
"branch out" to other products that it sells under the recognized trade emblem.
Shoppers who consider these new products often use their experience with the
original good when evaluating the commodity.
31. This is another reason why shoppers tend to prefer branded products over generics. Purchasing a commodity with a trade emblem is an investment for it gives
shoppers the opportunity to use their experiences in later excursions into the
market. Purchasing a generic, on the other hand, offers no potential for future
savings.
32. In the case of a trade name, the purchaser will rely upon his or her experience
with the firm itself.
33. There may be circumstances in which the other three messages also will be interpreted differently by various shoppers. For example, a trademark can be comprised of a foreign word, a situation discussed in greater depth infra at text
accompanying notes 127-40. To the shopper who does not understand the language, the emblem will convey only a denominative message. A shopper who is
familiar with the language, however, will interpret the emblem as conveying
either an allusive or a descriptive message, depending on the word chosen and
the context in which it is presented. See infra text accompanying note 134.
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that good is false if the quality of the product is significantly different.
If the associative message often proves inaccurate, purchasers may
become less willing to rely on their own experiences, thereby undercutting an efficient means of reducing information costs. As such, the
associative message can be false even when the other messages are
true.
3. Descriptive Message
Neither the denominative nor the associative messages are directly
affected by the intrinsic meaning of the word or symbol chosen as the
trade emblem.3 4 Indeed, some emblems with the strongest denominative and associative messages, such as KODAK, XEROX, and the
golden arches of McDONALD'S, simply are coined words or symbols.
Most trade emblems, however, are not original. Sellers tend to borrow
words and images that already have some meaning to the purchasing
public.
This tendency to borrow existing words is not due to lack of creativity. Sellers often choose existing words to communicate more than
just denominative and associative messages. Descriptive emblems,
like THRIFTY and BUDGET for car rentals, SUPER BUY for cigars,35
CONSISTENTLY SUPERIOR for bakery products,36 EVEREADY for
batteries,37 QUIK-PRINT for copy shops,3 8 and BLUE RIBBON for
condiments,39 send strong, yet subtle, signals to the shopper. These
emblems provide information about the good or service under consideration. When the marks relay such information, these signals operate as a form of advertising.
Descriptive emblems convey product information. As a result, they
can be very effective in reducing a purchaser's costs of gathering information. 4 0 Nevertheless, descriptive trade emblems can be among the
most difficult to protect. If a seller adopts as a trade emblem the common descriptive name for a product, the emblem will be refused protection on the basis that it is generic. 4 1 If the trade emblem describes
34. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 73-76, a descriptive word may not be
understood as conveying a denominative message. However, that word can become distinctive by acquiring "secondary meaning." When this occurs, shoppers
interpret the word as including a denominative message.
35. In re Consolidated Cigar Co., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290 (1995).
36. In re Duvernoy & Sons, Inc., 212 F.2d 202 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
37. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976).
38. In re Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 616 F.2d 523 (C.C.P-.A 1980).
39. Richard Helman, Inc. v. Oakford & Fahnestock, 54 F.2d 423 (C.C.PA4. 1932).
40. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 276.

41. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987)(dicta); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3rd Cir.
1986); In re Seats Inc., 757 F.2d 274 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); 1 GHsoN, supra note 17, § 2.02, at
2-19 ("A common descriptive or generic name is thus virtually impossible to re-
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a feature or quality of the product, it may be labelled descriptive and
protected only upon proof of secondary meaning.4 2 Thus, the current
law is less accommodating to the descriptive message than it is to the
3
associative and denominative.4
4. Allusive Message
Like the descriptive message, the allusive message stems from the
preexisting meaning of the chosen word or symbol. However, the word
refers to the product only obliquely. Grocery store shelves are filled
with products bearing labels such as BETTY CROCKER, AUNT JEMIMA, MRS. BUTTERWORTI-S, and the image of the Quaker on
QUAKER OATS cereals. As fictional characters, these emblems indicate source only in the most indirect way. On the other hand, such
emblems do convey a subtle message of hominess and comfort to shoppers. Similarly, the trade emblem CITGO for gasoline stations expresses a vague, but positive notion of being energetic, an especially
valuable idea in the gasoline market. 44 Other trade emblems tap into
other emotions. For example, HAAGEN-DAZ ice cream and PREGO
pasta sauce suggest a foreign flair, even though a quick scan of the
labels indicates that both products are domestic. Sellers hope that
this foreign flair will appeal to consumers who consider imported

move from the public domain, and no amount of advertising or other evidence of
secondary meaning is likely to succeed."). For additional discussion of this issue,
see note 70.
The concept of genericness applies to trade names, but in a somewhat different manner. Obviously, a trade name is the "common descriptive name" of the
company. But a party cannot protect a trade name that is the generic name for
the type of business in which the company engages. For example, a doughnut
seller could not protect the trade-name DONUT SHOP.
42. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992), reh'g denied, 505
U.S. 1244 (1992); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786,
790 (5th Cir. 1983); 1 GILSON, supra note 17, § 2.03, at 2-58 to 2-59.
43. As discussed infratext accompanying notes 73-81, trade emblems with a descriptive message may be refused protection because they are either "generic" or "primarily merely descriptive." Other barriers may impede protection of these
emblems. A trade emblem that uses a geographic term may be refused protection
as geographically descriptive or misdescriptive. Lanham Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e) (1994). Other descriptive terms may be held to be "immoral" or "scandalous" under Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994).
44. Conversely, other companies change their names to avoid sending a negative allusive message. For example, KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN recently changed
its name to the more neutral KFC, thereby avoiding the negative connotation of
the word "fried."
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goods either superior or more exotic. 45 If any of these 4feelings
are
6
pleasant to shoppers, they may result in increased sales.
Although purchasing a product because of a vague sense of comfort
is perhaps irrational, it commonly occurs. Therefore, both the descriptive and the allusive message can be important advertising tools.
Both are especially valuable to first-time shoppers. When faced with a
choice, many shoppers will opt for a familiar name instead of an arbitrary name. This gives a seller who uses a familiar emblem a head
start in developing customer loyalty, for only by actually purchasing a
product can a purchaser develop the experience necessary to generate
the more influential associative message.
Unlike the descriptive message, little attention has been paid to
the allusive. Admittedly, courts and commentators have on occasion
acknowledged emblem marks' subtle power to influence purchasing
decisions.47 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has claimed in
several cases that the descriptive or allusive message in a trade emblem could be a source of deception in the market. 48 These cases, how45. For example, restaurant chains are particularly fond of using names that express
vague moods or attitudes as evidenced by T.G.I. FRIDAYS and RALLY'S. Another common form of allusion is the use of geographic terms, not to suggest that
the good or service originated in that locale, but to invoke purchasers' attitudes
toward the place. Examples of this practice include LONDON FOG outerwear;
THE OLIVE GARDEN and OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE restaurants; and OLD
MILWAUKEE beer.
Sometimes the association is unintended. For example, NOKIA electronic
products are made in Finland. Many Finns joke that the company's success is
attributable to the name NOKIA (which is actually a small town in southern Finland), which sounds Japanese and therefore attracts purchasers who consider
Japanese-made electronics superior.
46. On the other hand, when appealing to a particular segment of the public, a seller
sometimes chooses a symbol that might be unattractive to the general population. How else can one explain the dispute in Death Tobacco v. Black Death USA,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1899 (C.D. Cal. 1993), in which the seller of BLACK DEATH vodka
succeeded in preventing another company from selling DEATH cigarettes?
47. Perhaps the most eloquent discussion of the allusive message is in the Supreme
Court's 1942 MishawashkaRubber decision:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less
true that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he
has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this
human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere
of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever
the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential consumers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942). See also Schechter, supra note 17, at 818-19.
48. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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ever, fail to recognize the full implications of the powerful advertising
messages inherent in these trade emblems.
A seller accordingly can pack up to four different messages in a
single trade emblem. Of course, as with any form of shorthand, trade
emblems have their drawbacks. Because most emblems are a word,
short phrase, or image, they can lack precision. Much of the information contained in a trade emblem must be implied and may vary according to the individual shopper's own life experience.
Despite their potential inaccuracy, trade emblems nevertheless
are useful communication devices. Obtaining information about a
good or service takes time and effort that the buyer could expend in
other efforts. While a trade emblem is perhaps not as accurate as a
complex verbal description, it does quickly convey a rough sense of the
relevant information. Buyers often are willing to forego a certain degree of accuracy in exchange for the tremendous reduction in their
costs of gathering information.4 9
The remainder of this Article will explore the significance of acknowledging that trade emblems are complex and important parts of a
market language. The first issue that must be addressed is whether
the current law of trade emblems is an effective way to deal with language. Second, even if the basic parameters of the system make
sense, a language analysis may provide insight on some of the more
troubling issues of trade emblem law.
C. Evaluating the Law of Trade Emblems in Light of the
Principles of Language
Law cannot exist independent of language. As a social control
mechanism, law depends on language to communicate important
ideas to all members of society. Language affords the lawgiver the
ability to operate proactively, communicating the social etiquette to
all members of society in advance, instead of sitting in judgment after
a breach of that etiquette has occurred.
But the traditional relationship between law and language is one
way. Law ordinarily takes language as a given. A lawmaker attempting to draft an effective statute searches the existing lexicon for the
proper combination of words that best expresses his idea. Even laws
attempting to regulate the use of language, such as defamation and
false advertising, do not attempt to define the words that comprise the
language; instead, these laws are designed to prevent people from using the existing lexicon for improper purposes. Language in all of
these cases is an extralegal axiom.50
49. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
50. Of course, statutes often define certain key terms. As discussed supra note 20,
languages use words only to express concepts that are familiar to the underlying
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Nor does the law ordinarily stand in the way of change in the language. Authors such as Lewis Carroll and Dr. Seuss have sprinkled
their works with coined words and phrases without any fear of legal
retribution. These coined words often fall into common usage and
thereby become part of the lexicon. Similarly, courts and legislatures
rarely intervene to prevent the natural changes in the meanings of
some words that occur over time.
The law will become directly involved with the content of language
when language is used to deceive.5 1 People generally are free either to
coin new words or to seek changes in the definitions of existing words.
Creating a new word rarely will result in deception. Listeners can be
fooled, however, if a person uses an existing word in a new way because the listeners may rely on the earlier definition. When reliance
on the preexisting meaning injures listeners, the law often will intervene. Yet there are limits to what the law is willing to do, even in
cases of deception. If society eventually adopts the new and changed
meaning of the word, then the law too will accept that definition.52
1.

The Basic Paradigm: Exclusivity in Trade Emblems

Countless courts and commentators have analyzed the reasons for
protecting trade emblems. Although their conclusions vary in some
particulars, all agree that information is a primary concern.5 3 Trade
emblems provide a way of significantly increasing the amount of information available to shoppers at a relatively low cost. 5 4 That informa-

51.
52.

53.
54.

culture. Because statutes tend to change the existing order, often no existing
word will precisely express the new concept created by the statute. Instead of
coining an entirely new word for the new concept, legislators tend to take the
closest word from the existing lexicon and give it a new meaning. This new
meaning applies only for purposes of the existing statute, not for other forms of
communication.
In a few situations, these statutes have changed the underlying language. It
is possible for the "legal" definition of the word to overwhelm the lay definition,
thereby becoming the primary meaning of the word in all communication. This is
especially likely when the statute in question regulates common activities so that
the legal definition will be used frequently.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 271.
A law that is codified in written form does not automatically change with changes
in the language. Therefore, the words used in statutes may not always reflect
modern parlance. For example, the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by enacting,
respectively, copyright and patent laws. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Translated
into modem parlance, "Science" actually means art and literature, while the
phrase "useful Arts" refers to science and technology.
For some of the better known examples, see 1 GsoN, supranote 17, § 1.03[2], at
1-22; 1 McCARTHY, supra note 17, § 2.01[1], at 2-3; Schechter, supra note 17.
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990);
Jerre B. Swann, The Economic Approach to Genericism: A Reply to Folsom and
Teply, 70 TRADEMAm REP. 243, 244 (1980).

1997]

TRADE EMBLEMS

tion, however, is valuable only if it is accurate. Because unrestricted
use of emblems can result in purchaser deception, the law allows only
a single seller use of a given trade emblem.S5
It may seem that limiting the use of a trade emblem is a curious
way to deal with deception. The linchpin of trade emblem law is its
grant of a limited monopoly on language. This approach deviates remarkably from the way that the law and language normally interact.
Although the law does not afford Dr. Seuss any exclusive right to the
words he created,56 the law does allow for ownership of coined words
and symbols such as KODAK, XEROX, and McDonald's golden
arches.57
This limited ownership also can have a direct effect on the content
of language. Unlike other people who coin words, the owner of a trade
emblem has a considerable degree of legal control over the meaning of
the word or symbol. The owner may employ society's legal machinery
to prevent others from changing the meaning.5 8 In these respects,
trade emblem law differs from other laws dealing with deception.
Notwithstanding these quirks, the basic model of trade emblem
law satisfies the core principles that should govern any law of language. Even though the system focuses on the "rights" of the seller,
its overall effect is to protect shoppers from deception. A system of
exclusive rights is especially useful given the nature of the message
that the law seeks to regulate. Because the message deals in part
with source, granting the actual source the power to police its message
will help to control deception and thereby facilitate market
communication.
Further, the law of trade emblems is not redundant within the context of other laws dealing with deception. The true source's strong
55. Restricting use to one seller limits deception by ensuring that commodities originate from the same source that shoppers have dealt with in the past. S. REP. No.
79-1333 (1946).

56. Copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, or simple designs.
DONALD S. Cmsum & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTEICTUAL PROPERTY LAw 4-31 &n.96 (1992). Copyright law can be used to protect more complex
pictorial trade emblems, however.
57. On rare occasions, courts have invoked the policy disallowing ownership of the
language to deny trade emblems rights to a seller. For example, in Different
Drummer,Ltd. v. Textron, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court refused to extend trademark protection to Thoreau's phrase "The man who hears a
different drummer drumming" because it considered the phrase "the property of
all English-speaking peoples." Id. at 674.
58. The law does more than simply provide the owner of a trade emblem a cause of
action for damages. The Lanham Act, for example, provides for the seizure and
destruction of infringing items, Lanham Act § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1994), and
orders customs officials to seize any imported products that infringe a United
States mark, Lanham Act § 42,15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994). These provisions demonstrate that society will support a trade emblem owner's power to control the
language.
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financial incentive to protect its position makes the law of trade emblems equally or more effective than other laws regulating deception.
If the owner of a trade emblem polices the area of market communication, the government is free to deal with other forms of deception. A
language analysis therefore supports the fundamental scheme of exclusive rights.
2. Basic Rules
A system of exclusive private rights requires some sort of mechanism to determine which of the various claimants receives the exclusive right. In addition, it is necessary to determine the scope of these
rights, including the sorts of trade emblems in which the rights exist,
the geographic reach of the rights, and identifying acts that infringe
on those rights. Courts and legislatures have responded to these
needs by developing certain basic rules. Many of these rules, however,
were developed without full consideration of the implications of language. Thus, it is necessary to determine how these rules affect communication in the marketplace. Although this Article casts these
rules in a new light, the basic principles of trade emblem laws are
essentially sound rules of language.
a. Emblems That Can Be the Subject of Exclusive Rights
Most legal systems protect a wide variety of trade emblems. In
addition to words, the law will protect phrases,59 drawings, and even
product attributes, such as shape and color. 6 0 Generally, the law requires only that the seller use an emblem that shoppers will recognize
as referring to a unique entity in the marketplace. The seller need not
59. Roux Lab., Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823 (C.C.P.A. 1970)(protecting "Hair
Color So Natural Only Her Hairdresser Knows For Sure"); Application of E.
Kahn's Sons Co., 343 F.2d 475 (C.C.PA. 1965)(protecting "TheWeiner the World
Awaited"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allstate, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Tex.
1969)(protecting "You are in good hands with ALLSTATE"). See generally 1 McCARTHY, supra note 17, § 7.20-7.23, at 7-26 to 7-33 for other examples.
60. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995Xprotecting
color); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), reh'g denied, 505
U.S. 1244 (1992)(protecting "trade dress"); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632
(7th Cir. 1993)(protecting product shape). However, because shoppers are more
likely to assume that shape and color are functional parts of the product itself, it
can be more difficult to prove that these trade emblems are distinctive indications
of source. Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co., Ltd., 50 F.3d 189 (3rd Cir. 1995),
cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 54 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMM=ON
§ 16, cmt. b (1995). Indeed, even though the United States Supreme Court held
in Two Pesos that distinctive trade dress could be protected without showing secondary meaning, its opinion in Qualitex assumes, without discussion, that secondary meaning must be shown in the case of color. See Qualitex Co., 115 S. Ct. at
1303.
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prove that shoppers can recall having seen the emblem before,
nor
that they can name the seller associated with the emblem. 6 1
How this broad rule fits within the principles of language may not
be obvious. Although it is easy to justify the inclusion of drawings,
color, and other devices capable of communicating a message, a language analysis supports a seller's exclusive rights in such symbols
only if the emblem will somehow reduce the amount of deception in
the marketplace. The possibility of deception is clear when emblems
have been used widely by purchasers and have developed a strong associative message. Shoppers who spot a familiar trade emblem will
expect that the good or service associated with that emblem will be of
approximately the same quality as it was in the past. Purchasers will
be deceived if the emblem is used by a different seller because the
actual quality of what they purchase may fail to meet their expectations. 6 2 Therefore, allowing only the true source to use the emblem
helps to prevent an emblem from conveying false associative and denominative messages.
But the law also protects emblems that have not developed an associative message. Such an emblem will not mislead shoppers because they have not yet formed any expectations concerning the
product or service. Under this view, protecting these emblems cannot
be justified as a means of policing the misuse of language in the
market.
Nonetheless, even absent an associative message, a trade emblem
may convey up to three other messages to shoppers. A shopper who
spots a trade emblem will likely assume that the good or service is of a
certain minimal quality, even if she has never before encountered the
trade emblem. Moreover, an emblem that describes the good or suggests superiority will convey its message to all shoppers who are familiar with the preexisting meaning of the word. The current rules
protecting trade emblems without secondary meaning can pass muster as rules of language only if the rules help reduce deception caused
by other messages.
The descriptive message cannot serve as the basis for protection.
First, because descriptive messages exist only in preexisting words,
coined words and symbols will have no descriptive message. Yet,
under the current scheme, coined trade emblems are the easiest to
protect. More importantly, however, granting exclusive rights in an
emblem based upon the descriptive message would defeat the basic
goal of increasing efficient and accurate market communication. If
one seller has exclusive rights to a descriptive term, competitors will
61. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992).

62. The law allows a party to recover for infringement without demonstrating that
the infringer intended to deceive anyone or even knew that anyone else was using
the emblem.
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be precluded from using that term in connection with their commodities. Yet as long as the description is accurate, there is no reason why
other sellers should be precluded from informing shoppers of that accuracy, even if they use the same words.63 In fact, allowing competitors to use the same words to describe similar product features may
actually improve the accuracy of communication by establishing some
uniformity, which simplifies product comparisons. Like any prohibition of truthful advertising, granting exclusive rights in a descriptive
emblem may impair the already limited flow of information in the
marketplace.
It is more difficult to determine whether the allusive message is a
basis for protecting trade emblems. Unlike the descriptive message,
the allusive message relates only vaguely and indirectly to the commodity. It is more persuasive than informative. Moreover, there are
usually multiple ways to express the same or similar sentiment, especially in a language as wordy as English. Therefore, in many cases the
law could grant one seller exclusive rights to an allusive emblem without significantly impairing competitors.
Although such a rule may satisfy the needs of competition, it is
much more troubling when viewed as a law of language. Granted, no
great injury results if the law grants a seller an exclusive right in an
allusive emblem. The lack of injury to competitors, however, is not
itself a reason to grant exclusive rights. Outside the realm of trade
emblems, the law does not afford a monopoly in a word merely because
a party can show that word has numerous synonyms. 6 4 The party
must instead demonstrate that the grant of exclusivity meets some
other social goal, such as reducing deception or encouraging innovation. Limiting the ability of competitors to convey vague, yet true
ideas about themselves, their good, or their service does not cure deception. Therefore, the allusive message cannot serve as a basis for
exclusive rights in a trade emblem.
It is the denominative message that justifies granting exclusive
protection to sellers. Unlike the descriptive and allusive messages, all
trade emblems convey a denominative message. In addition, the denominative message will be false if more than one seller uses that emblem. Shoppers make certain basic assumptions about quality when
they spot a trade emblem in the market. Hence, allowing a second
company to sell the same product under the same emblem can deceive
63. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 290.
64. The law of copyright also allows a party to gain exclusive rights in words and
symbols. However, as discussed supra note 56, copyright is unavailable in single
words, short phrases, and many of the simple symbols used as trade emblems.
Even when the two areas of law do overlap, the purpose of copyright law is quite
different. Traditional copyright law has little to do with deception. Instead, its
purpose is to encourage the creation of new expressive works by ensuring that
artists and authors can reap the financial benefits of their creations.
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customers if each seller's product differs in quality. Granting one
party an exclusive right in a particular trade emblem reinforces the
denominative message by ensuring that all commodities bearing the
same emblem do indeed originate from the same source. The denominative message supports the grant of exclusive rights in all words or
symbols that shoppers recognize as trade emblems, regardless of
whether they have yet developed an associative message. 6 5
In addition, granting exclusive rights in trade emblems conveying
a denominative message will increase the total amount of information
conveyed by trade emblems. First, granting exclusivity to a specific
emblem will make it easier for that emblem to acquire an associative
message because an emblem cannot convey an associative message
unless shoppers have consistent experiences with the product. By ensuring that a single emblem is always connected with a single source,
a grant of exclusive rights helps purchasers develop these associations
between the emblem and quality. Second, granting exclusive rights
increases the strength of all trade emblems. Unless shoppers know
that they can depend on a one-on-one connection between a trade emblem and a source, they are not likely to trust their experience as a
basis for making purchasing decisions. The current rule verifies the
denominative message, encouraging shoppers to buy other branded
products and develop other associative messages.
This rationale is quite different from the arguments used to support exclusive rights in other forms of intellectual property. Unlike
patent and copyright law, society is not rewarding the seller for creating something new. Trade emblem law instead gives rights in trade
emblems out of a recognition that the seller's adoption of a trade emblem may make communication in the market more efficient. As a
corollary, rights in a trade emblem should exist only as long as the
emblem continues to convey accurate information.
b.

Seniority and Ownership

A language analysis also supports the basic means by which ownership rights in trade emblems are allocated. Most legal regimes assign the exclusive rights to whomever first "adopts" the emblem. In
some situations, such as corporate-name laws and many foreign trademark systems, adoption occurs when the party registers the emblem
with a government agency. Other laws, such as the common law rules
governing trademarks and trade names, require actual use of the
emblem.6 6
65. This assumes that the emblem is recognized as conveying a denominative
message. As discussed infra text accompanying note 76, certain descriptive

phrases may not be perceived as sending a denominative message.
66. Although the trademark systems of Canada and the United States descend from
the common law tradition, both are now hybrids that determine rights based on
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It may seem that language analysis would not mandate a system
based on seniority. The denominative message will be accurate as
long as the law guarantees that the emblem is used by only one seller.
If the only goal is to ensure an accurate denominative message, which
seller receives the mark is not particularly important. Nevertheless,
the seniority rule does further the considerations relevant to language. 6 7 Society maximizes the amount of information conveyed by a
trade emblem by allowing that emblem to develop an associative
message. That message can develop only if the emblem indicates only
one level of quality to shoppers. Because at least some purchasers will
have dealt with the entity who first uses the emblem, it follows that
giving exclusive rights to that entity will best protect any nascent as68
sociative message.
c.

Categoriesof Trade Emblems

A language analysis also supports and even offers additional insight into some of legal distinctions regarding trade emblems. These
distinctions are the most developed in trademark law, which divides
marks into five different categories: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic. Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are
protectable immediately upon adoption. Descriptive marks, by con69
trast, receive no protection until they acquire secondary meaning.
both registration and actual use. This is largely in response to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, 13
U.S.T. 1, which requires signatories to honor rights that are based on domestic
registration.
67. Copyright, the other major legal regime providing exclusive rights in words and
images, also bases rights on seniority. However, the reasons for a seniority rule
in copyright are clear. Unlike trade emblem rights, copyright is a reward for
creativity. Therefore, only the creator-the "senior user"- should qualify for
legal rights.
68. A registration-based system accomplishes the same end. As first used at common
law, a seller who registers a trade emblem has the exclusive right to use it in a
given market. This helps the associative message develop by ensuring that the
word or symbol will always refer to only one seller. Trade emblem law differs
only in that the seller in a registration-based system can "reserve" the emblem,
which provides some flexibility to decide where and how to present it to shoppers.
In some ways, a registration-based system is more effective than a use-based system. Such a system can help prevent wasteful disputes among sellers by providing a quick and easy way for them to determine whether someone else has
claimed the word or symbol.
Basing trade emblem marks on seniority may help feed the notion that trade
emblem law is a subset of intellectual property law. Patent and copyright protection similarly vest in the first person either to create or to file. However, as the
text demonstrates, although both trade emblem and intellectual property law
consider seniority, they do so for very different policy reasons.
69. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S.
1244 (1992); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S.
315 (1938); Talk to Me Prods., Inc. v. Larami Corp., 992 F.2d 469 (2nd Cir. 1993);
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Generic marks can never be protected in most jurisdictions in the
United States. 70
These distinctions accord with the principles of language. The only
reason for society to afford a seller exclusive rights in a trade emblem
is to foster accurate associative and denominative messages. Protecting fanciful marks easily satisfies this standard. A fanciful mark is a
word or symbol that has been coined by the seller. Because it has no
intrinsic meaning, the only messages it can convey are associative and
denominative. The seller who adopts a fanciful mark has added a new
word with a single definition to the vocabulary of the market.
In each of the other four categories, however, the word or symbol
has a preexisting meaning. Depending on that meaning, these marks
may also convey an allusive or descriptive message. If the allusive or
descriptive messages are strong, they may predominate in market
communication. Accordingly, the distinction between arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic marks can be explained only by evaluating the respective strength of the various messages conveyed by
the mark. The law should protect a mark with a preexisting meaning
only if the seller demonstrates that shoppers recognize the denominative message in the mark.
Arbitrary marks are the easiest to analyze. These marks convey
neither an allusive nor a descriptive message. Although the mark is a
recognized word, that word is not used in its normal context. In fact,
the use of the word falls so far outside its normal context that shoppers do not perceive it as conveying any information concerning the
good or service. Thus, for example, when the seller of COMET
cleanser first used the mark, it conveyed only a denominative message
and accordingly could be protected immediately.
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992);
Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., 172 F. 859 (2nd Cir. 1909). See generally
1 GILSON, supra note 17, § 2.03, at 2-58-73.
70. See supra note 41. See also Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845
(5th Cir. 1970)(suggesting that granting exclusive rights in a common product
name would violate public policy); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991Xholding that "386"is the generic name for a
type of microprocessor); First Natl Bank v. First Nationwide Bank, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1457 (W.D. Mo. 1990Xholding that FIRST NATIONAL BANK can
never be protected).
Gilson also indicates, however, that some types of generic marks can be "recaptured" by showing secondary meaning. 1 GmSON, supra note 17, § 2.02[7], at
2-49. Recapture cases involve the special situation where a mark, although originally a suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful term, gradually comes to be considered
by consumers as the generic name for the product. If those terms later regain
their distinctive meaning, the courts will protect them. The doctrine of recapture
ordinarily does not apply to trade emblems comprised of inherently generic
words.
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A similar rationale supports the protection of suggestive marks.
Since shoppers make some connection between the mark and the commodity, shoppers will receive either an allusive or a descriptive
message. For example, while the mark UPTOWN on records may convey an allusive message, 7 1 the same mark on a taxi service might be
descriptive. A mark will be labelled suggestive, however, only if the
connection between the mark and the commodity is not facially obvious, requiring shoppers to use their imagination to make the connection. 72 Because the connection is less direct, the mark will likely be
interpreted by shoppers as more than just a description of the good or
service. This additional meaning is a denominative message, which
allows shoppers to use the mark as a repository for their experience.
Descriptive and generic marks, in contrast, represent a shift in this
balance. A generic mark ordinarily is a noun 73 for which the preexisting meaning is the name of the product or service. For example,
although the mark APPLE may be arbitrary for computers, it is generic for apples. A descriptive mark is an adjective that explicitly describes some aspect of the good or service. In the case of an apple,

RED, SWEET, and FRESH would be descriptive.7 4

Both generic and descriptive marks convey strong descriptive
messages. 75 Unlike suggestive marks, however, the descriptive
message overwhelms the denominative. If shoppers do not perceive a
denominative message, protection of these marks is unjustified. In
71. Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 101 F.3d 648 (2nd
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 386 (1996).
72. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983); General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1940), reh'g denied, 112 F.2d 561
(4th Cir. 1940). See generally 1 GrLsoN, supra note 17, § 2.04, at 2-74 to 2-78.
73. Courts, however, are more frequently finding that even acectives can become
generic. For example, the court in Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), found that the term LITE, when used in
connection with beer, had become the generic name for a particular subcategory
of beer. For a criticism of this trend, see 1 GiLsON, supra note 17, § 2.02, at 2-16
n.2. The Seventh Circuit also expressed some discomfort with the reasoning in
Miller in its opinion in Henri'sFoodProducts,Inc. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d
1303 (7th Cir. 1987).
74. As used in this Article, the term "descriptive message" is not meant to be coextensive with descriptive marks. Although descriptive marks will convey descriptive
messages, they are not the only category of trade emblems that can do so. A
suggestive mark such as PIZZA ROLLS for snack food also conveys a descriptive
messages. Jeno's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 227 U.S.P.Q. 227 (D. Minn. 1985). In
this case, however, the description is less direct.
75. Descriptive marks may also convey allusive messages. For example, the mark
YESTERYEAR, although descriptive when used on tapes of old radio programs,
also invokes a vague sense of nostalgia. Premier Elec. Lab v. Aston, 686 F. Supp.
815 (C.D. Cal. 1987), vacated, 914 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990). In that case, the
descriptive message overwhelmed the allusive, and the court therefore found the
mark descriptive. However, in trade emblems where the allusive message
prevails, the emblem will likely be suggestive.
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fact, granting exclusive rights in descriptive and generic marks will
impair, rather than facilitate, communication. Returning to the earlier example, the only denominative message that shoppers derive
from the mark APPLE on apples is that the product is indeed an apple. This may distinguish the commodity from a pear or nectarine, but
not from apples sold by other sellers. Similarly, although shoppers
can use the word SWEET to distinguish the seller's apples from other
varieties, shoppers cannot use the term to distinguish this particular
SWEET apple from other melliferous apples. As a result, purchasers
will not perceive the term SWEET as denominating a single source.
Yet, a seller with a descriptive mark is not absolutely precluded
from protection. A descriptive mark can be protected by showing that
it has acquired secondary meaning. 7 6 The doctrine of secondary
meaning or "acquired distinctiveness" recognizes that although a
mark is not inherently distinctive, over time shoppers may come to
associate it with a single source. 7 7 Secondary meaning develops
through shopper experience. This is not the same as the associative
message, however. Shoppers will develop an associative message only
if they actually obtain and use the commodity. Secondary meaning
can develop merely if shoppers repeatedly see the emblem on the store
shelves.78 Therefore, secondary meaning
is part of the denominative,
rather than the associative, message. 7 9
From a language perspective, calling this shopper experience a secondary meaning is particularly ironic. The acquisition of "secondary"
meaning is really a change in the primary definition of the word, at
least when that word is used in the context of a particular good or
service.S0 This change in definition occurs as purchasers begin to rec76. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Thomas & Betts Corp.
v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
The Lanham Act does not use the term "secondary meaning," but instead speaks
in terms of marks that have "become distinctive of the applicant's goods." Lanham Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C § 1052(f) (1994).
77. PusTATamENT (THnm) OF UNFiR CoMPNTrrIoN § 13 cmt. e (1995). See also G. &

C.Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
78. Of course, secondary meaning can also develop if shoppers purchase and use the
commodity. In fact, secondary meaning is likely to develop more rapidly when

shoppers purchase the good because they are likely to pay more attention to the
branding of something that they purchase.

79. This distinction becomes clearer when one considers the content of the message.
The message inherent in secondary meaning is simply that the commodity comes
from a single source. Unlike the associative message, it has nothing to do with
the actual quality of the commodity.
80. Courts also have recognized the problems with the term secondary meaning. See,
e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 497 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P-.A 1974)(holding a
trademark that has acquired secondary meaning has a new primary meaning);
Spang v. Watson, 205 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1953Xsame).
In terms of a language analysis, the current concept of "secondary meaning" is
actually a hybrid of two logically distinct ideas. First, if a seller borrows a word
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ognize the mark as denominating a single source. The newly recognized denominative message replaces the descriptive message as the
primary meaning of the emblem. Because this new meaning relates to
source, the law is justified in giving exclusive rights to marks with a
up of denominative, and in some cases asprimary meaning made
8
sociative, messages. '
These same principles, however, suggest that barring rights in generic marks is misguided. A generic mark transmits primarily a descriptive message. Although change in that message certainly is less
likely than in the case of descriptive marks, shoppers might nonetheless come to perceive the mark as an indication of source rather than
the name of the good.8 2 If the primary meaning does change, courts
message prevails over the
should acknowledge that the denominative
83
descriptive and should protect the mark.
Aside from the question of secondary meaning for generic marks,
the five categories of marks help courts accommodate the different
messages encompassed in different marks. Fanciful, arbitrary, and
suggestive marks can be protected from the moment of adoption beas a trade emblem from the existing vocabulary, that word will have a preexisting primary meaning. If shoppers recognize that the word is an indication of
source, however, that word will have a "secondary" meaning when used in the
context of the seller's specific good or service. This version of secondary meaning
does not require purchasers to have any experience with the good. Second, secondary meaning can refer to the overall message that shoppers receive when viewing the emblem, a composite of the four component messages. Two of these
messages, the denominative and the associative, will gain in strength as shoppers are continually exposed to the emblem. If shoppers have had experience
with a branded product, the denominative and associative messages may override the descriptive and allusive messages so that shoppers will interpret the emblem as indicating a single source. To buyers without that experience, however,
the descriptive or allusive messages may prevail.
81. The same conclusion applies to misdescriptive trade emblems. These emblems
convey a predominantly descriptive message that happens to be false. If that
descriptive message predominates, the emblem should be unprotected. In fact,
because the message may deceive shoppers, the case for denying protection to
misdescriptive emblems is even stronger. On the other hand, a misdescriptive
trade emblem should qualify for protection if it acquires secondary meaning. Because the denominative message is so strong, shoppers will ignore the content of
the descriptive message and construe the emblem solely as a means to differentiate the seller from its competitors.
82. A generic term is more likely to acquire secondary meaning if it has one or more
synonyms. If a single seller adopts one of the synonyms, shoppers could readily
come to associate the term with that seller.
83. In fact, from the perspective of language, it is an oxymoron to speak ofa "generic"
term with "secondary" meaning. As noted above, the acquisition of secondary
meaning results in a change in the primary meaning of the emblem, at least
when it is used in market communication. If the primary meaning of the term
now relates to a particular seller, the term is no longer interpreted by shoppers as
a product name. Courts should therefore admit evidence of secondary meaning in
all cases to determine the real meaning of the word in the market lexicon.
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cause such marks convey a clear denominative message. Generic and
descriptive marks, on the other hand, convey a predominantly descriptive message. Until continued experience with the mark causes shoppers to revise the mark's definition, the law should not provide
exclusive rights in such a mark. Generic and descriptive marks
should be like all other words in the lexicon of the market-free for all
to use.
d. Defining the Market Itself. GeographicalLimitations
Common law rights in a trade emblem are limited geographically.
For most trade emblems, the owner is entitled to exclusive rights only
within a given market.8 4 This market is the geographic area where
the commodity using the emblem is sold or, in the case of a trade
name, where the firm does business.
A language analysis supports limiting trade emblem rights to identifiable markets. After all, trade emblem rights are an exception to
the general policy against granting exclusive rights in language. Any
grant of exclusivity should be no greater than necessary to prevent
deception. Granting exclusive rights in trade emblems certainly helps
to check deception within the market where the seller does business.
If multiple sellers use the same emblem, the denominative message
and any associative message conveyed by that emblem will be false.
Extending exclusive rights beyond that market, however, will not further reduce deception. Outside of the owner's market, none of the four
messages are false because the emblem has no accepted definition.S5
84. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).

85. To illustrate, suppose that a seller wants to adopt a trade name identical to the
name already used by a different firm engaged in a similar business but in a
different market. Suppose further that this particular trade name conveys all
four of the possible messages. The law would be justified in preventing the seller

from using the mark if any of the four messages conveyed by the seller prove to be
false.

The associative message presents the easiest question. That message depends on purchaser familiarity with products from a given source. Even if purchasers in the owner's market have gained familiarity, purchasers in the other
market who have not dealt with the owner cannot mistakenly rely on their past
experiences. Therefore, forbidding the junior user from using the trade name is
unnecessary to prevent a false associative message. In fact, inefficiency results
because the new user is prohibited from using the mark to develop its own associative message.
The other three messages, however, do not depend on whether shoppers have
used the product. In each market, a purchaser who sees the trade name will
receive precisely the same denominative, descriptive, and suggestive messages.
None of these messages is "false," however. As long as the two firms are engaged

in the same business activity, the descriptive and suggestive messages are
equally valid from each seller. Likewise, because the prior user is not participatingin the seller's market, the trade name is accurate because it denominates only

a single firm in each market. If all three of these messages are true in both mar-
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Therefore, confining rights to the area where the trade emblem is
used represents the correct balance between the interest in developing
accurate and efficient communication and the countervailing interest
of ensuring that the language is as free as possible for all to use. In
terms of language, each market can develop its own dialect, comprised
of the words and symbols used in that market.8 6 If multiple sellers
use the same emblem in different markets, the same word can develop
different meanings in each market, depending on the associative
message that each seller develops. Because each dialect is in essence
the official language of that market, no real purchaser confusion
results.
Nevertheless, the common law principles that confined trade emblem rights to markets is increasingly the exception rather than the
rule. State and federal trademark laws often define rights in terms of
political rather than economic regions. The Lanham Act, for example,
affords nationwide rights to trademark owners. Similarly, corporate
name laws give a company the exclusive right to use a name throughout an entire state or nation. Neither the trademark nor the corporate
name laws require that the trade emblem actually be used throughout
the entire area.
Although significantly expanding the range of the exclusive rights,
these statutes do facilitate market communication. In essence, they
represent a concession to modern realities. Markets are no longer the
relatively static entities that they were in the 19th century. Advances
in technology, especially in travel and communication, have led to
rapid fluctuations. Today it is quite common for a purchaser who usually shops in one market to travel to, and buy in, a different market. If
the same words have different meanings because of the "dialect" of the
market, cross-border purchasers are likely to make erroneous
purchasing decisions. At the same time, firms are continually expanding, thereby resulting in market growth. Even in countries as
large as Canada and the United States, nationwide distribution is increasingly common and has become the norm in many industries.
Similarly, recent trade agreements such as the European Union and
NAFTA allow for transnational markets.
kets, a prior user should be unable to prevent another seller from adopting the
name in a different market.
86. This analysis admittedly is quite simplified insofar as it focuses on the market for
a single good or service. In the real world, of course, shoppers purchase a vast
array of different goods and services. Each good and service actually involves a
submarket. Because each good and service will be distributed in different areas,
the boundaries of different submarkets will likely differ. Therefore, the overall
vocabulary of the market will vary from place to place depending upon the boundaries of the submarkets. Although this Article simplifies the issue by focusing on
a single product, its conclusions apply with equal force to a multiproduct market.
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In recognition of this trend, a trade emblem statute like the Lanham Act attempts to define a national dialect that everyone in the national market will understand. Registration provisions are the crux of
these statutes. In a sense, registration is akin to the creation of a dictionary that standardizes the vocabulary of the national market. Following registration, the registrant can prevent others from using the
emblem on similar commodities anywhere in the nation. As a result, a
given trade emblem can acquire only one associative message for the
entire nation.8 7 In addition, because the registries are public records,
shoppers can quickly ascertain the content of the denominative
message.
A uniform market vocabulary helps prevent the confusion that
might otherwise arise because of regional market dialects. It also reinforces the general assumptions of quality and consistency that shoppers connect with trade emblems. In this way, registration statutes
increase the overall accuracy and efficiency of trade emblems better
than the common law rules.
e. Infringement
Infringement is the primary means of enforcing trade emblem
rights. To prevail on an infringement claim, the owner of a trade emblem must prove that the defendant's use is likely to result in purchaser confusion. Courts determine likelihood of confusion by
referencing to a number of factors.88
A language-based analysis suggests a similar approach. Because
the law grants trade emblem rights only as a means to prevent purchaser misunderstanding, the owner should have a right to sue only in
cases where misunderstanding is likely to occur. Determining likelihood of confusion presents certain special considerations. A trade emblem is especially vulnerable to shopper misunderstanding because
its most important advantage-its ability to convey a great deal of information in a small package-is also one of its major weaknesses.
Confusion of any one of the four messages of a trade emblem can cause
the purchaser to misinterpret the overall message. Therefore, the law
needs the flexibility to recognize errors in any of the component
messages.
In any communication, the likelihood that a reader or listener will
confuse one word for another depends on several factors. The key factor is the similarity between the words themselves. Determining shni87. The trademark registration symbol helps in this regard. When purchasers ob-

serve the symbol, they know that the trade emblem has a national, rather than a

local, definition.
88. United States courts do not entirely agree on the factors that should enter into a
determination of likelihood of confusion. For an excellent comparison of the leadig views, see 1 GILSON, supra note 17, § 5.01[3][i], at 5-16 to 5-29.
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larity is not a mechanical comparison, but a flexible analysis that
must consider a variety of factors, such as spelling and pronunciation.
Similarities in meaning or connotation may also cause readers or listeners to confuse otherwise dissimilar terms. Finally, because words
gain meaning from the contexts in which they are used, the context in
which a word appears may affect the possibility of misinterpretation.
The "likelihood of confusion test" in trade emblem law follows the
same approach, comparing the marks and their respective markets.
The primary factors are the visual and aural similarity of the
marks.8 9 Courts also look to similarities in the meanings of words,
even when the appearance and pronunciation are markedly different.9 0 Because many trade emblems are existing words, this factor
recognizes that purchasers may use the descriptive or allusive
messages to help distinguish emblems. Finally, the analysis also considers the "context" by focusing on similarities or differences in the
commodities with which the emblem is used.9 1 Therefore, the likelihood of confusion test is flexible enough to recognize the different
means by which purchasers may confuse consumers.
In virtually all respects, then, the basic principles of trade emblem
law fare remarkably well when subjected to a language analysis.
Although a trade emblem is a word in the vocabulary of the market,
giving the person who first adopts an emblem a limited exclusive right
in that word provides a means to police market deception. To be fully
effective, that exclusive right should extend to all situations in which
a seller uses a trade emblem to convey essentially the same messages.
The right to exclude, however, should be limited geographically to the
area in which the trade emblem has a denominative message.
Although this normally will include areas in which the emblem is
used, a legislature may expand this zone of exclusivity to deal with
situations of expanding markets or porous market boundaries. Finally, the likelihood of confusion test limits the seller's exclusive
rights to situations where shoppers may be deceived.
These basic rules represent merely the skeleton of trade emblem
law. Legislatures and courts have fleshed out these principles with
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAm COlOPrrON § 21 cmt. c (1995)("The starting
point in any infringement case is a comparison" of the marks.). Although most
cases involve a defendant who uses a trade emblem, confusion can also occur in
other ways. For example, in Dial A Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d
675 (2nd Cir. 1989), the plaintiff was allowed to challenge the defendant's phone
number. The defendants number, 628-8737, spelled "MA1TRES," a term almost
identical to the plaintiffs trade name.
90. RESTATEmENT (THID) OF UNFAIR COMEm'ON § 21(a)(v) (1995)(indicating that
courts should look to the "suggestions, connotations, or meanings" of words).
91. American consumers, for example, have little trouble recognizing that the mark
DELTA has very different meanings depending upon whether they see it used in
connection with airlines, plumbing fixtures, or dental plans.
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detailed rules and tests. Most of these rules and tests were developed
without any conscious consideration of the effects that trade emblem
law has on communication in the market. Therefore, each of the many
specific rules of trade emblem law needs to be reevaluated from the
perspective of language.
A comprehensive review of trade emblem law is far beyond the
scope of this Article. It will take the judiciary a number of years to
explore whether various rules of trade emblem law facilitate communication. Nevertheless, this Article facilitates such a review in two
ways. First, it demonstrates how some of the "problem" areas of trade
emblem law can be analyzed as questions of language. Second, it
places the law of trade emblems in its broader context by identifying
legal rules that, although generally considered to be outside the realm
of "trade emblem law," nevertheless work with trade emblem law to
regulate communication in the market.
III. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF LANGUAGE: PROBLEM
AREAS IN THE USE OF TRADE EMBLEMS
Part I of this Article demonstrated that the traditional paradigm of
trade emblem law fails to recognize that trade emblems often convey
several different messages. Admittedly, legislatures and courts operating under the traditional paradigm have established a basic infrastructure that satisfies the principles of language. Yet the devil is in
the details; use of the traditional paradigm has caused many
problems. Some problems arise because the traditional paradigm fails
to acknowledge the complex ways in which trade emblems communicate information. Other problems arise because courts and legislatures have failed to recognize that trade emblem law does not stand
alone, but is merely one of several ways that the law affects the language of the market.
The remainder of this Article will explore a few of these questions.
Resolving these various problems by using an approach that focuses
on the various messages in trade emblems helps illustrate the comprehensive nature of that approach.
A.

False Advertising in the Use of Trade Emblems

The law protects trade emblems because of their important role in
increasing the amount of information conveyed in the market. But
information is valuable only if it is accurate. Therefore, although the
law encourages the use of trade emblems, it also includes devices to
ensure their accuracy.
The law of trade emblems certainly helps in this endeavor. As
demonstrated above, the basic claim of infringement is a means of controlling false information. Use of similar emblems on similar products
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may convey a false denominative message and possibly a false associative message. Granting the right to bring legal action in such situations preserves the accuracy of these messages.
Many emblems also send descriptive or allusive messages. These
messages provide relevant information about the product or service
being sold. Many shoppers rely on the descriptive and allusive
messages when making purchasing decisions, particularly when they
have not developed an associative message with the emblem. That
descriptive or allusive message can be false if the product lacks the
characteristic suggested by the emblem. Because shoppers may rely
on the information conveyed by the emblem, using a trade emblem
that conveys a false descriptive or allusive message can lead to considerable deception in the market. 92
Trade emblem law provides some means for dealing with this problem. The Lanham Act, for example, commands the Patent and Trademark Office to deny registration to marks that are "deceptive"93 or
"deceptively misdescriptive." 94 Yet, the PTO's power to control false
92. Although the allusive message can lead to deception, the vast majority of deception is attributable to false descriptive messages. Because the allusive message
is so vague, it is unlikely to create any clear expectations in purchasers concerning the product.
93. Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994).
94. Id. § 2(e). The Patent and Trademark Office has relied on both provisions to refuse registration to marks that convey false information. See, e.g., R. Neumann &
Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786 (C.C.P-.A 1964)(refusing to register
DURA-HYDE for artificial leather); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Biringal-Bigsby Corp., 319
F.2d 273 (C.C.P-.A 1963)(refusing to register AMERICAN BEAUTY for sewing
machines made in Japan); Caldwell Lane Leather Co. v. Western Filament, Inc.,
173 U.S.P.Q. 695 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1972)(refusing to register NEOHIDE for artificial leather). But see Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling
Co., 958 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992)(using BLACK WATCH on whiskey will not
deceive purchasers into thinking that the product comes from Scotland);
Fleischwaren-Export-Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Columbia Packing Co., 177 U.S.P.Q.
220 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1973)(allowing registration of
DEUTSCHMACHER ("German maker") for meat products not made in
Germany).
Many courts have found it difficult to distinguish § 2(a) and § 2(e) of the
Latham Act. One author has suggested that the distinction turns on whether the
representation is material. Kenneth B. Germain, TrademarkRegistration Under
Sections 2(a) and 2(e) ofthe Lanham Act: The Deception Decision, 44 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 249, 267 (1975). According to this theory, a deceptively misdescriptive mark
misleads consumers, but does not cause them to purchase the product. A deceptive mark, by contrast, does influence the purchase. Although this theory fits
well with the statutory language in most respects, it inadequately explains why
§ 2(e) refuses registration to a mark that causes no purchaser injury.
In addition to its other advantages, a language analysis of the law of trade
emblems offers another way to distinguish § 2(a) and § 2(e). A trademark, like
any trade emblem, can convey multiple messages. Deception in any of the
messages is possible. A "deceptively misdescriptive" mark could incorrectly describe some aspect or feature of the good or service. Although any false descrip-
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information is limited. Although it can deny registration, the PTO
lacks any authority to order anyone to cease using a misleading mark.
The law of trade emblems also calls upon private parties to police
this form of deception.9 5 In addition to the infringement provisions,
which allow private parties to police false denominative and associative messages, a seller may sue a competitor who engages in false advertising under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, analogous state statutes,
or at common law.96 These causes of actions often have been employed against sellers who use trade emblems that send false descriptive messages. 97 Likewise, shoppers who are induced by a misleading
trade emblem to purchase the seller's goods or services may bring suit

tive message can be misdescriptive, it becomes "deceptively" misdescriptive only
if consumers purchase the product in reliance on the representation. A "deceptive" mark could make a representation unrelated to quality or features. For example, in Goodman v. FederalTrade Commission, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957),
the Federal Trade Commission obtained a cease and desist order against a seller
who did business under the trade emblem WEAVER'S GUILD, arguing that use
of the term was misleading where no such guild actually existed. This representation differs from the typical case because the mark did not describe the product
itself. Therefore, use of the WEAVER'S GUILD emblem was "deceptive" without
being "misdescriptive."
The difference between § 2(a) and § 2(e) is more than mere form. A "deceptive" mark can never be registered. However, § 2(f) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (1994), allows the owner of a deceptively misdescriptive mark to register
it upon proof of secondary meaning. The suggested distinction supports this rule.
If a mark acquires secondary meaning, it acquires a strong associative message
based on consumer distinction. Because purchasers who use a product know its
features, secondary meaning will overcome any deception that may be generated
by a deceptively misdescriptive mark. The types of representations involved in a
deceptive mark, however, cannot be verified by experience. A consumer might
purchase WEAVER'S GUILD products for years and yet never determine
whether such a guild existed. Because experience cannot overcome the falsity in
a deceptive message, merely because the emblem has acquired secondary meaning should not make a difference.
95. It is interesting to note that trade emblem law approaches the issue of false advertising in an entirely different way than it approaches confusion as to source.
Instead of giving one party an exclusive right to police the market, the law enlists
the help of all competitors.
96. The leading state statute is the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which at
least 11 jurisdictions have adopted in some form. A few states have adapted the
Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, a very popular consumer
protection statute, by extending its protections to competitors. The two main
common law actions are deception and disparagement.
97. See, e.g., Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 760 F. Supp. 36
(E.D.N.Y. 1991)(using the word OFFICIAL on a guide book falsely implies the
book was endorsed by a public authority); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. New York Air
Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983Xcalling an airline service a SHUTTLE implies certain characteristics that defendanes airline did not offer).
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under federal and state law, although curiously not under the Lanham Act.98
Even with these safeguards, trade emblem law cannot always ensure accurate information. A variety of reasons explain why competitors and purchasers may be unwilling or unable to sue a seller who is
deceiving purchasers by use of a trade emblem.99 Unless competitors
and purchasers cooperate, the law of trade emblems cannot itself control the truth of the descriptive and allusive messages.
Of course the law has a variety of tools other than trade emblem
law to control false information. Some mechanisms follow the model
of trade emblem law and rely on private individuals. For example,
someone injured by a false statement may be able to recover for defamation. Similarly, the law of express warranty gives purchasers the
right to recover for injuries caused by their reasonable reliance on a
false representation by the seller. In addition, the law sometimes enlists the aid of government, especially when speech in the market is
involved. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission is the
main government agency charged with controlling market deception.' 0 0 Unlike the PTO, the FTC has the authority to order a seller
to stop a deceptive trade practice.'Ol Although the vast majority of
cases involve claims made in advertising, the FTC has on occasion
used its authority to challenge the use of trade emblems.302
98. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982), protects consumers
against sellers. Consumers may also look to state contract law, as modified by
the state's version of Uniform Commercial Code, for relief. However, as explained in supra note 9, most courts prohibit use of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act to
sue sellers engaged in false advertising.
99. For a discussion of some reasons why private remedies may prove ineffective, see
Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protectionand the Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 HARv. L. REv. 661 (1977).
100. The Federal Trade Commission is not the only agency involved in this task. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and a
number of state agencies also police deception.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2), (b) (1994).
102. Most reported decisions involve trademarks and service marks. Indeed, one of
the best known FTC cases dealt with a misleading trademark. In Charlesof the
Ritz Distributors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 676 (2nd Cir.
1994), the defendant used the mark REJUVENESCENCE on a facial cream. The
FTC claimed that the mark, coupled with an extensive advertising campaign,
falsely implied that the cream could actually restore skin. Charles of the Ritz is
best known for its discussion of the "fool's test," applied by the FTC until 1984, to
determine whether an ad was deceptive. The case is also notable because it involved a deceptive trademark.
The FTC has declared trade emblems deceptive in several other cases. See,
e.g., Arrow Metal Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 249 F.2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1957)(selling plasticcoated products as PORCENAMEL is deceptive because it implies a porcelain
enamel coating); FTC v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930)(holding imitation fruit drink sold as GOOD-GRAPE is deceptive); Stanley Labs. v. FTC, 138
F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1943)(using MD in trademark for powder is deceptive because
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Although the law has a variety of tools to deal with deceptive trade
emblems, none were designed to deal with the unique language
problems posed by trade emblems. To satisfy the criteria of a language analysis, the law of deception must be sensitive to the various
messages conveyed by a trade emblem. A trade emblem that misdescribes a good or service may still send an accurate denominative and
associative message to shoppers who recognize that the word or symbol is used as a means of identification. These messages may affect
the strength of the descriptive message that shoppers actually perceive. Therefore, before concluding that an emblem is deceptive because of a false descriptive or allusive message, a court needs to
consider all of the messages conveyed by that emblem and determine
the total packet of information that purchasers derive from that emblem. A strong denominative or associative message may override any
false descriptive or allusive message, thereby preventing deception.
Courts applying trade emblem law do not completely recognize this
possibility. Under the Lanham Act, a deceptively misdescriptivemark
can be registered if the applicant demonstrates that the mark has acquired secondary meaning.10 3 Deceptive marks, on the other hand,
cannot be registered even upon proof of secondary meaning. Even assuming that it is possible to distinguish deceptive and deceptively misdescriptive marks,10 4 there is no reason to treat them differently once
they acquire secondary meaning. Regardless of the reason why the
descriptive or allusive message is false, purchasers who develop an
associative message will allow their own experience override any representations received from the trade emblem.
The various private remedies for false advertising also acknowledge to some extent the different messages contained in a trade emblem. In general, a competitor or purchaser bears the burden of
proving that the defendant's claim is false. The plaintiff normally will
attempt to show falsity by a survey or other evidence that reveals
shoppers' overall impressions of the message.10 5 This requirement,
however, is relaxed in some cases brought under § 43 of the Lanham
it implies endorsement by doctors); Masland Duraleather Co. v. FTC, 34 F.2d 733
(3rd Cir. 1929)(holding it is deceptive to sell artificial leather as DURALEATHER
even when accompanied by the phrase "durable leather substitute"). See also 1
GHsoN, supra note 17, § 1.03[8][c], at 1-44 to 1-45. Although the cases all involve
marks, the FTC's § 45 mandate is broad enough to reach any deceptive trade

emblem.
103. Lanham Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994). This provision, however, does not
apply to primarily geographically misdescriptive marks.

Section 2(f)

was

amended to exclude these marks in response to a provision of the recent North
American Free Trade Agreement.
104. For a discussion of the difference between deceptive and deceptively misdescriptive marks, see supra note 94.
105. For an extensive discussion of the many facets of proving falsity, see 2 McCARTRY, supra note 17, § 15.
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Act, the most widely used private remedy. When a competitor can
demonstrate that a seller's claim is "explicitly false," it is unnecessary
to proffer proof of how purchasers perceive the message.' 0 6 Like the
absolute bar on deceptive marks in § 2(a), the explicit falsehood rule
in a trade emblem case focuses only on descriptive and allusive
messages. As a result, courts may find a mark deceptive when it actually does not fool shoppers.
The Federal Trade Commission also considers only the descriptive
and allusive messages of a mark. In cases dealing with deceptive
trade emblems, the Commission has insisted that the descriptive
message be entirely accurate. In some of these cases, however, evidence showed that the emblem had acquired an associative message
that overrode the descriptive.107 The Federal Trade Commission's insistence on technical accuracy could be justified only as an attempt to
protect shoppers who had not developed this associative message in
the product name.1 0 8 Even under this rationale, the Commission's approach focuses exclusively on the descriptive message, thereby failing
to consider the entire message conveyed by trade emblems. In fact,
the FTC may have actually generated additional consumer confusion
in these cases. By forcing sellers to change the name of their trade
emblem, the Commission denied shoppers the benefit of any associative message that had developed.
Although the rules governing deceptive trade emblems fill a definite need, they fail to entirely satisfy the principles of a language
analysis. To compound the problem, courts sometimes have looked
myopically at only the descriptive and allusive message, thereby overlooking the denominative and associative messages. By failing to consider all of the messages, these courts may have prohibited the use of
trade emblems that caused little, if any, purchaser deception.
106. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods. Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1982).
107. This is perhaps most evident in a pair of decisions involving the lumber industry.
In the first half of this century, types of woods unknown to the public often were
labelled with a familiar name. Typically, the chosen name was botanically inaccurate. The Commission invoked this technical inaccuracy in several cases challenging the industry practice. In two cases, the court agreed. In In re Leask, 56
F.T.C. 946 (1960), the court ordered a seller of eucalyptus to stop selling it as
"Australian Oak" or "Tasmanian Oak." In Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934), the Court ordered sellers of a yellow pine to stop
marketing it as "California white pine." Evidence in both cases demonstrated
that a significant portion of the public used "Australian/Tasmanian Oak" and
"California white pine" as the common names for the products. In other words,
the technically inaccurate names developed an associative message. Shoppers in
these markets were not fooled by the false descriptive message. In both cases,
however, the courts required the sellers to use the unfamiliar botanical name
instead of the familiar nickname.
108. In Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 80 (1934), evi-

dence showed that sellers were starting to sell the wood in new markets.

1997]

TRADE EMBLEMS

131

B. Trade Emblems as Warranties of Quality
1.

What a Trade Emblem Says About Quality

Viewed together, infringement and false advertising laws cooperate in addressing the means by which a trade emblem can convey false
information to shoppers. As discussed in section H.A of this Article,
false advertising law is best equipped to deal with misleading descriptive and allusive messages. Courts typically use the law of infringement, however, when the problem results from a false denominative
or associative message.
On the other hand, the law of infringement cannot deal with all
types of deception caused by denominative and associative messages.
In some cases, it is possible for a seller to convey false denominative
and associative messages without infringing on someone else's mark.
Because false advertising law does not cover these situations, the law
has no ready cure for some forms of deception.O 9
Denominative and associative messages are important to buyers
because they suggest certain basic ideas about the quality of a commodity. Shoppers' expectations regarding quality will not be met if a
seller changes the product's quality. To prevent this sort of deception,
the law should restrict a seller's ability to change the quality of the
commodities sold under a trade emblem. Otherwise, shoppers cannot
be sure that a trade emblem's denominative and associative messages
are valid.' 1 0
As the law currently stands, a seller can protect a trade emblem
merely by registering or using the trade emblem. The seller need not
demonstrate that the commodity meets any base standard of quality
or that the quality will remain consistent. As a result, sellers can protect trade emblems with a false denominative message.
109. Conceivably, some forms of false advertising law, especially the FTC Act, could be
used to deal with false denominative and associative messages. Misleading purchasers as to source certainly qualifies as an "unfair or deceptive" practice within
the meaning of § 45 of the FTC Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). The Commission has not used its authority to deal with false designations of origin, perhaps because it recognizes that the private enforcement system of trademark law
was designed to deal with that problem.
110. Of course, there is a very strong economic motivation to maintain quality. To
maximize the return on the investment in a trade emblem, the seller must develop a strong and favorable reputation, which is achieved only by selling goods of
consistently high quality. This economic incentive, however, is an insufficient
control. First, fluctuations in the quality of one seller's product affect more than
just that seller's goodwill. If purchasers' expectations consistently are unmet,
purchasers may lose confidence in trade emblems as a means of communication
and turn instead to other, less efficient means. Second, the law of trade emblems
results in a form of monopoly in a word or symbol. That limitation may affect the
ability of other competitors to communicate and therefore is justified only if it
reduces deception.
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Certain rules purport to deal with this problem. For example,
courts often compare the quality of the owner's and infringer's goods
when determining whether an infringement has occurred.1 This
rule, although useful in some cases, falls far short of a general requirement of consistent quality. In addition, it is hornbook trademark law
that a seller abandons a mark if the quality significantly deteriorates. 11 2 In practice, however, this rule has been applied almost exclusively in cases involving an owner who transfers a mark to a
licensee or assignee without taking any measures to ensure continuing quality control.liB Aside from these cases, only a few relatively old
cases discuss whether a party's unilateral decrease in quality results
in abandonment.14 In all of these cases, the courts held that the
change was too insignificant to result in a loss of rights.
Even stricter application of these rules would do little to remedy
the basic communication problem and, in fact, may increase deception.
Any competitor, including the original owner, could adopt an abandoned mark and gain exclusive rights. Abandonment simply erases
priority in the emblem. Except in the rare case where the new owner's
products happen to be of the same quality as the original owner's, purchasers who buy in reliance on the associative message will be
deceived.
Of course, the law of trade emblems is not the only means of dealing with the problem of quality. False advertising laws arguably are
more effective in dealing with this particular type of deception, especially considering that false advertising laws focus on the message instead of the privileges of the messenger. Courts, however, generally
do not consider that a trade emblem use itself involves any actionable
representation of the quality of the good or service unless the emblem
itself is misdescriptive of quality.315
111. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1979); 1
GmSON, supra note 17, § 5.01[31, at 5-19.
112. Elmer Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FoRDUmAm
L. REv. 363 (1974), is perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of this doctrine.
113. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1969)(holding that a
trademark and its goodwill cannot be assigned unless the mark is used by assignee on products having substantially the same characteristics).
114. The case most commonly cited for this proposition, Independent Baking Powder
Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910), actually was a case involving an
assignment of the mark. Courts dealing with unilateral changes of quality have
been remarkably lenient. For example, in Royal Milling Co. v. J.F.Imbs Milling
Co., 44 App. D.C. 207 (1915), the court allowed a seller to substitute hard wheat
flour in a product that traditionally had been made with soft wheat flour. The
court in Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. LorrilardCo., 299 F. 834 (D.N.J. 1924), affid,
7 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1925), affd, 273 U.S. 629 (1927), went so far as to allow a
seller to make any product changes that might improve sales.
115. There is one notable exception. In Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Baking
Powder,4 F.T.C. 1 (1921), the Federal Trade Commission used § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to prohibit a seller who had altered a product from contin-
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Contract law provides another possible means to deal with the issue of quality. The growing law of warranty, especially the various
"implied" warranties, provides purchasers with some assurance concerning the base quality of goods. Yet, warranty law also is incapable
of dealing with the problem of trade emblems. First, it does not deal
with false associative messages. Absent some other express representation by the seller, merely labelling a good does not constitute a warranty that the good is of the same quality as in the past. Second, most
of the significant increases in warranty law have involved goods, not
services. 1 ' 6 Finally, warranty law only cures part of the harm caused
by decreased quality. Although it allows the aggrieved purchaser to
recover its loss, it does not restore general shopper confidence in the
denominative and associative messages.
Therefore, to preserve the accuracy of denominative and associative messages, the law needs a means to correct the deception that
occurs when a seller adjusts the quality of its product. The best approach would combine false advertising and trade emblem law. In addition to eliminating the original owner's exclusive rights, the law
should preclude any seller from using the trade emblem in connection
of
with the same commodity until shoppers realize that commodities
7
the quality they expect are no longer available in the market.11
2. Increasing Quality
The discussion of quality to this point has assumed that the trade
emblem owner is selling a product of inconsistent or poor quality. In
either situation, purchasers will receive some products that are unsatisfactory. Because purchaser dissatisfaction will directly affect the associative message and indirectly affect the denominative, the law
should have some means to ensure uniformly acceptable quality.
In actuality, many sellers increase the quality of their products.
Like any change in quality, an increase will disrupt the denominative
and associative messages. That does not necessarily mean that the
principles discussed above should govern. A language analysis helps
to point out the unique considerations involved in these cases.
Unlike the seller who decreases quality, the seller who improves its
product should be neither deprived of its exclusive rights nor subuing to use the same trademark on that product. For an excellent discussion of
how Lanham Act § 43(a) might be used as a means ofpolicing quality, see Hanak,
supra note 112, at 368-70.
116. The Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty provisions and the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act apply only to goods.

117. A prohibition against using a trade emblem could be enforced most easily by a
government agency such as the Federal Trade Commission. Of course, regardless
of how the prohibition is enforced, the law should include a way to notify sellers of
which marks are unavailable.
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jected to false advertising laws. Although misinformed, shoppers do
not suffer any direct injury from the inaccurate information. If they
buy the product or service, they will find it to be well above the base
level of quality that they associate with branded goods or services of
that nature, reinforcing their general faith in denominative
messages. 1 ' 8 Admittedly, because the associative message understates the actual level of quality, the misinformation is more likely to
cause purchasers to buy other sellers' products. This false message is
inefficient because purchasers may end up with inferior products.
Nevertheless, that is no reason to take away the exclusive rights of a
seller who increases the quality of its product. Although in a lessthan-optimal situation, purchasers are still receiving products that
meet or exceed their expectations.
Similarly, depriving the owner of its rights could directly injure
purchasers by allowing another seller to adopt the mark. Purchasers
will continue to interpret the trade emblem using the associative
message they developed for the original owner. This message will be
deceptive if the new seller's product is of lower quality. Therefore, because a seller whose goods are of higher quality than suggested by the
associative message does not deceive purchasers to their detriment,
increases in quality should not result in a loss of rights.
This argument raises other considerations. For example, it is no
defense to an infringement action that the defendant's product is better than the trade emblem owner's. Regardless of the quality of the
infringer's commodity, the infringer is not the trademark "owner" and
therefore should be unable to use the trade emblem to make shoppers
believe otherwise. In essence, shoppers have a right not to be misled
even if they would be better off with the misleading information.
Even though language analysis recognizes that a trade emblem
contains several different messages, this same analysis actually supports the current rule. Because the trade emblems of the owner and
infringer are identical or very similar, the infringer's descriptive and
allusive messages basically are as accurate or inaccurate as the

118. Purchasers conceivably could be injured even in this situation. If product quality
increases steadily over a long period of time, purchasers might develop an expectation that the quality will always be better than it was in the most recent
purchase. Once the quality levels out, purchaser expectations might be
frustrated.
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owner's. 11 9 Yet, the denominative and associative messages conveyed
by the infringer will be false.12o
The real issue, however, is whether shoppers are deceived to their
detriment. A purchaser is not likely to complain if the commodity
turns out to be better than expected. Without purchaser injury, it is
not readily apparent why the trade emblem owner should recover for
the deception. Allowing a suit for infringement in this situation rewards the seller of lower-quality commodities at the expense of a
seller who tries to improve quality.
Nevertheless, false information can injure purchasers even if they
receive a higher-quality good. First, "quality" does not mean the same
thing to all purchasers. Rather, the concept of quality is quite amorphous. Most goods and services have many separate features that
may appeal to purchasers, each of which exhibits its own level of quality. Different purchasers may be drawn to different features.12 3 Similarly, some purchasers may not define quality in terms of the product,
but instead by reference to the producer.122 These purchasers also
will be injured by the competitor's use of the original trade emblem.
Second, there is no consensus on quality. Even when shoppers
agree on what features constitute quality, they may disagree on
whether a particular commodity is of "high" or "low" quality. For example, virtually every shopper would agree that taste is an important

factor in choosing food products. Taste, however, is purely subjec119. As always, there could be exceptions. For example, if a competitor sells premium
quality goods under the mark BASIC (a mark currently in use for cigarettes), the
descriptive message in that emblem is technically false. Similarly, a seller who
charges high prices would deceive shoppers by using the mark THRIFTY (a mark
currently in use for car rental services).
120. The denominative message is false because the emblem fails to indicate a single
source. Similarly, if an associative message exists, the infringer's use of the emblem falsely suggests to shoppers that the infringers goods are of the quality that
shoppers have come to expect when dealing with the owner of that emblem.
121. To illustrate, suppose that an oil company derives a formula for gasoline that
dramatically increases both vehicle performance and mileage. Should this seller
be entitled to sell the product as SHELL or some other brand name, under the
argument that consumers will be better off? A loyal SHELL customer who judges
gasoline based on performance and mileage certainly would be happy to be the
"victim" of deception because the new product is superior. Other purchasers,
however, may judge quality by other criteria. If the new gasoline increases vehicle emissions, for example, a purchaser whose primary criterion is pollution will
consider the new product to be worse than SHELL.
122. Some people may prefer SHELL gasoline because of a basic affinity for Shell Oil,
perhaps because of the company's philanthropic activities or because a relative or
friend works for the company. Perhaps a better known example is BEN &
JERRY'S ice cream. This company is attractive to purchasers not only because of
the high quality of its ice cream and frozen yogurt, but also because of its widely
publicized, fairly progressive corporate policy. Although these sorts of preferences may seem unreasonable when measured in the light of logic, they are nevertheless a very real motivation for a significant percentage of purchases.
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tive.123 While many or most purchasers may conclude that the taste
food product is of higher quality, others may
of one company's
4
disagree. 12
Third, allowing a defense of superior quality in an infringement
case could cause other sorts of purchaser injury. If the defense was
available, a junior user would be free to use the emblem when competing with the original owner. Purchasers could randomly buy a
number of the infringer's goods, thereby developing a higher expectation of quality. If those same purchasers subsequently purchase the
original owner's goods, purchaser's inflated expectations would be left
unsatisfied. To prevent such confusion, the owner should have a right
to prevent the infringing use.125
123. Taste certainly is generated by tangible stimuli. However, the individual's idiosyncratic reaction to those stimuli determines taste. Moreover, even though the
things we enjoy can be dictated by external factors such as culture and upbringing, the concept of taste is still fundamentally subjective.
124. Of course, both parties conceivably could sell products of equal quality. For example, if the trademark owner obtains its product from a third party, a defendant
who buys from that same source is, by definition, supplying a product of exactly
the same quality as the owner's. Because the owner's trade emblem indicates a
certain level of quality, the defendant might argue that it too should be entitled
to use the emblem to convey that associative message.
Nevertheless, the owner should prevail. First, some purchasers may determine overall quality based not only on the product itself, but also on the seller's
post-sale policies, such as service (admittedly unlikely in the case of apples). Second, other purchasers may prefer a particular seller for reasons totally unrelated
to the commodity. These purchasers will be deceived to their detriment if a defendant is free to use the owner's emblem. This result does not place any significant restrictions on the defendant's ability to compete. As long as the law allows
comparative advertising, a defendant is free to tell shoppers that its apples are of
the same quality as the owner's. If the law also provides a "nominative fair use"
defense, the defendant may even use the owner's mark when making the
comparison.
125. The obvious counterargument, of course, is why the seller of the lower quality
product should be entitled to prevail merely because it is senior. After all, it was
the lower quality of the senior user's products that caused purchasers to be disappointed. In this case, the law might choose to give the exclusive right to the junior user who at least benefits consumers by increasing the overall quality of
goods.
The current approach to the problem, however, is a superior rule of language.
Viewed from a language perspective, the cause of action for infringement is not
intended solely for the benefit of sellers. The law gives rights to sellers merely to
enlist their aid in policing market deception. Although the law could in theory
appoint any seller to this role, it selects the senior seller to encourage the most
rapid development of associative messages. Because purchasers most likely have
associated with the senior seller, any associative message that they have developed is most likely to relate to that seller. Moreover, the actual quality of the
seller's goods fails to affect how quickly the associative message develops. A
trade emblem will acquire an associative message as long as the level of quality of
the products sold under the emblem remains fairly consistent.
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Therefore, although there is some logical support for a "superior
quality" defense, a language analysis supports the majority view. Parties who compete with the owner certainly should be encouraged to
develop superior products. The law, however, should also encourage
newcomers to use new and unique trade emblems with their products.
The new trade emblem will allow purchasers to associate the higher
level of quality with a second, clearly distinguishable, trade emblem.
This result preserves the strength of the denominative message. In
addition, because there will be two trade emblems with two separate
associative messages, requiring the newcomer to adopt a new emblem
maximizes the potential for efficient market communication.' 2 6
C. Borrowing a Foreign Term as an Emblem
Markets convey information using one or a very few "official" languages. Sellers who borrow terms generally take the word from this
official language. Sometimes, however, sellers borrow words from foreign languages.127 These cases present unique considerations when
viewed from the perspective of a language analysis.
Most courts apply a fairly mechanical rule to foreign trade emblems. If the language from which the word is borrowed is dead or
extremely obscure, courts generally will allow the seller to protect the
trade emblem. 128 Because shoppers are unlikely to understand the
word, they are similarly unlikely to rely upon the prior existing meaning. Courts essentially treat these emblems as fanciful.129
126. In addition, as noted supra note 124, the junior party ordinarily will have the
right to engage in comparative advertising, possibly even using the owner's mark
as a means of referring to the owner.
127. In addition to the cases cited infra notes 128-132, see Skol Co. v. Olson, 151 F.2d
200 (C.C.P.A. 1945), where the seller had adopted a variation of the Swedish
term "skAl" as its trade emblem.
In all of the cases involving foreign trade emblems, a seller has borrowed a
foreign word. Conceivably, a seller could also borrow a symbol or image with a
particularly strong meaning to a certain foreign culture. In a sense, using nonLatin alphabets is analogous to using a "symbol" that has a particular meaning to
another culture. See, e.g., In re Oriental Daily News, Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
637 (1986)(refusing to protect Chinese characters that translate into "Oriental
Daily News"). Because people also communicate through symbols, these cases
should be resolved under the same basic analysis that applies to words.
128. See Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1952Xclassic Greek);
McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles H. Phillips Chemical Co., 53 F.2d 1011 (2nd
Cir. 1931)(Patagonian); William Waltke & Co. v. Geo. H. Shafer & Co., 263 F. 650
(D.C. Cir. 1920)(Latin).
129. Of course, if the borrowed word is spelled or pronounced like an English word, it
will be treated as a variation on that English word even if the meaning is different. See Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978)(holding
that although based on a classical Greek root, TELEMED is descriptive for telephone medical services). Compare Telemed Corp. with Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon
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For words borrowed from most recognized modern languages, however, the analysis requires a second step. A seller can protect an English term only if it is used in an arbitrary or suggestive fashion.
Descriptive emblems can be protected only upon a showing of secondary meaning, and generic emblems usually are denied protection
under any circumstances. Likewise, courts hesitate before protecting
a seller who has adopted a mark that is a foreign translation of either
a descriptive or generic English word. 130 Most courts apply the "doctrine of foreign equivalents" to borrowed foreign terms. Under this
approach, the court translates the word into English and then determines whether the English word qualifies for protection. 13 1
The doctrine of foreign equivalents has often been criticized.132
Most of the criticism focuses on the application of the rule, especially
when it is used to deny protection to foreign words that the vast majority of shoppers do not understand. More serious questions arise
when the issue is considered from the broader perspective of a language analysis. Indeed, language analysis suggests that the law
should contain a presumption in favor of protecting foreign terms,
Corp., 198 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1952)(holding TELECHRON for electric clocks to be
arbitrary).
130. A foreign trade emblem may itself become a generic English term, especially
when the product or service to which the emblem is attached is unique. Thus, the
German term "Bundt" has come to identify a unique product sold in the United
States, not a single source for that product. In re Northland Products, Inc., 777
F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A foreign word can become a generic English term
regardless of whether it was a generic term in the mother tongue, like Bundt, or
whether it was a trademark. Purchasers adopt the term as the English generic
because the product or service previously was unknown to the market and accordingly no English term readily describes it. A foreign trademark like BUNDT
is no different than NYLON and CELLOPHANE, which similarly describe products that were at one time unique. The language of the market can adopt fanciful
and foreign terms as product names with equal ease.
131. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984)(Italian); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 256 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Cal. 1966)(German), affd, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel &
Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P-A. 1961)(Hungarian); Nestle's Milk Prods.,
Inc. v. Baker Imports Co., 82 F.2d 193 (C.C.P.A. 1950)(French); In re Oriental
Daily News, Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 637 (1986)(Chinese); In re New Yorker
Cheese, 130 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120 (1981XPolish); In re Westbrae Natural Foods,
Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642 (1981)(Japanese); In re Bagel Nosh, Inc., 193
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316 (1976)(Yiddish); In re Garcia, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 732
(1972XSpanish); In re Hag Aktiengesellschaft, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 598
(1967)(Serbian).
For a variation on the theme, see In re AGE Bodegas Unidas, S.A, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 326 (1976), where the Board denied registration to the mark RIOJA SIGLO under Lanham Act § 2(d). Although the English translation of the
term was neither generic nor descriptive, the court held that the translationwas
confusingly similar to the mark CENTURY, which already was used for whiskey.
132. The most persuasive criticism appears in 1 McCARTy, supra note 17,
§ 11.14[21[b].
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even when they are widely recognized translations of descriptive or
generic English terms.
First, depending on the word, some percentage of the population
will not recognize the meaning of the foreign term. To this group, the
word conveys no descriptive or allusive messages whatsoever. Even
shoppers who know the translation of the term will detect something
out of the ordinary when they encounter a foreign term on a good or
service. Shoppers are accustomed to product names and descriptions
in the official language of the market. A foreign term will therefore
stand out and may be recognized by shoppers as a seller's attempt to
identify itself to the market.133 Unlike the generic English translation, the foreign equivalent may convey a recognizable denominative
message.
Second, foreign terms may convey other messages to purchasers.
Without secondary meaning, the only message that an English descriptive or generic term will convey is descriptive. Foreign or foreignsounding terms, however, may also impart an abstract, vague sense of
mystery or quality to a product.134 This is the allusive message.' 3 5
The allusive message will attach even if the chosen term is a foreign
translation of a generic or descriptive English word. Regardless of
whether shoppers know the translation, a seller's use of the Swedish
term CHOKLAD will create an impression that the English
equivalent CHOCOLATE will not.1 36
An allusive message is not itself a sufficient reason to protect a
trade emblem. The existence of an allusive message, however, may
133. Certain factors may increase the likelihood of the foreign term having a denominative message. For example, if only one seller uses the term, then shoppers are
more likely to recognize it as an indication of source. In addition, purchasers are
more likely to derive a denominative message from a foreign adjective than from
a foreign noun. Finally, as with all marks, the presentation of the word may
affect the shopper's impression. A word that is presented in stylistic print, with
other features, is easier to distinguish than one in plain type.
134. Sometimes, however, borrowing a foreign term would prove deceptive. If purchasers recognize the term, they might take it as a representation that the product actually comes from the area in which the foreign language is spoken. If the
product does not come from that location, purchasers are deceived. In this sense,
all foreign trade emblems should be evaluated to determine whether they are
geographically misdescriptive.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
136. In fact, this allusive message may be even stronger to the purchaser who is familiar with the foreign language. Many words cannot be precisely translated into
other languages because they have shades of meaning peculiar to one language
and its culture. See, e.g., WmRBIcKA, supranote 20, for a fascinating discussion
of one such word, the Russian term Dufa. Shades of meaning will carry over
when those terms are used as a trade emblem and will have an effect on those
purchasers who are familiar with that language. Use of the foreign term suggests not only the vague sense of foreignness, but also those subtle shades of
meaning that do not exist in the English translation.
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make it easier for purchasers to distinguish the foreign term from its
English equivalent. If the law provided exclusive rights in the foreign
term, it might become an efficient indication of a single source much
more quickly than its English counterpart.
Third, foreign terms do not involve the same issues of need that are
present in English descriptive and generic terms. The foreign term is
unnecessary for competitors to communicate ideas in the marketplace.
Competitors are always free to use the descriptive and generic terms
of the official language to describe their products.137 Alternatively,
competitors also may appropriate descriptive and generic terms from
third languages as trade emblems.
The result is that the doctrine of foreign equivalents, in its current
form, is too strict. Rarely are foreign terms merely the "equivalent" of
their English translation. Even if most purchasers understand the
foreign term, purchasers are more likely to recognize that a foreign
word is used as a trade emblem. On the other hand, this does not
mean that foreign equivalents of English descriptive and generic
terms automatically deserve protection. Foreign terms present their
own unique considerations, which in certain cases might warrant refusal of protection.SS The problem, however, is that the current law
focuses too narrowly and should be reevaluated as a question of language. At the very least courts should consider evidence of how purchasers actually perceive a foreign trade emblem.139
137. Even if both parties were selling chocolate from Sweden, the junior user would be
free to describe his product as SWEDISH CHOCOLATE. In most cases, however,
the junior user could not use the foreign term in descriptive fashion, for example,
by calling the product something like XYZ CHOKLAD. With respect to an English descriptive mark that has acquired secondary meaning, courts would apply
the doctrine of fair use to allow competitors to use the same mark in a descriptive
fashion. However, a junior user's descriptive use qualifies as fair only if it will
not result in shopper confusion. Because ofthe allusive messages in such a mark,
use of a foreign descriptive or generic term in descriptive fashion would probably
prove confusing to a significant percentage of consumers. It would be especially
confusing to shoppers who did not know the language. In such a case, shoppers
would have to distinguish between CHOKLAD and XYZ CHOKLAD, neither of
which has any inherent meaning to them.
138. In some cases, a product with a foreign trade emblem will be marketed only to
shoppers who speak that particular language. In this case, it is more likely that
those shoppers will perceive of the mark as a descriptive, rather than a denominative, message. In addition, as discussed supra in note 135, foreign terms are
more likely to be interpreted as representations concerning geographic origin.
139. See 1 McCARTHy, supra note 17, § 11.14[21[b]. The need for a more flexible approach is even stronger in the case of more obscure languages. Suppose, for example, that a United States seller called its chocolate SUKLAA. Few shoppers
will recognize this as the Finnish generic equivalent for chocolate. Because Finnish terms are rarely used in the language of the market, this term could quite
easily function as a mark, even to those few purchasers who speak Finnish.
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D. Dilution
In an extremely influential article, Frank Schechter argued that
the only "rational" basis for protecting trademarks is preserving their
distinctiveness.14o Schechter realized that this distinctiveness allowed purchasers to differentiate between competing products. These
arguments, augmented by other influential scholars,141 laid the
groundwork for today's antidilution statutes. 142 Unlike most other
trademark laws, antidilution statutes allow the owner of a trademark
to recover without showing that purchasers are likely to be confused.
This often allows the owner to recover against anyone who uses the
mark, even on noncompeting goods. The theory underlying the antidilution laws is that by preventing widespread use of a mark, the
laws preserve the distinctiveness of the seller's mark.
Dilution has always shared an uneasy relationship with the rest of
trademark law. A language analysis sheds considerable light on the
issue of whether it is desirable to protect the distinctiveness of a mark.
Courts have considered some of the language implications in their efforts to apply the antidilution laws. In so doing, courts have identified
two main varieties of dilution.143 The first, sometimes called "blurring," occurs when a mark with a strong secondary meaning loses that
meaning after the mark is used on noncompeting goods.144 "Tarnishment," by contrast, arises when a seller uses the owner's mark in a
way that causes purchasers to think of the owner, but in a negative or
humorous way. 145
140. Schechter, supra note 17.
141. Two of the more influential articles on the concept of dilution include Beverly W.
Pattishall, The Dilution Rationalefor Trademark-TradeIdentity Protection, Its
Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. I REv. 618 (1976), and Walter J. Derenberg,
The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Anti-dilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L.

REv. 439 (1956).
142. Until 1996, protection against dilution came entirely from state law. Approximately half of the states have adopted anti-dilution statutes. See CAL. Bus. &
PRoF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765 para.
1035/15 (Smith Hurd 1993); MASS. GEN. L. Ann. ch. 110B § 12 (West 1990); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1980); N.Y. GENERAL BusINEss LAw § 368-d
(McKinney 1996); 54 PENN. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 1124 (1996). In 1996, Congress
amended § 43 of the Lanham Act to add a federal cause of action for dilution.
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985,
985 (1996). This new law undoubtedly will frame the continued debate in this
area.
143. The court in Deere & Co. v. MTD Products,Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 1994), identified other categories of dilution. However, these simply involved variations on
the basic themes identified in the text.
144. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2nd
Cir. 1989). Had the mark been used on competing goods, the owner could sue for
infringement.
145. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir.
1994); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992),
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A language analysis reveals a third, as yet unacknowledged, category of dilution that can be dubbed "descriptive use." In this category,
a competitor who is trying to mimic the owner's unique good or service
uses the mark in comparative advertising to refer to the original prod-

uct.1 46 Descriptive use threatens the distinctiveness of a mark by

making it easier for the mark to become the generic name of the
unique good or service.
Antidilution statutes protect owners by allowing them to recover
without proving purchaser confusion. Typically, all that the owner
must demonstrate is a likelihood that the mark will in some way lose
its distinctive quality. Courts generally have used antidilution laws to
protect strong marks from the potential loss of their selling power.147
In terms of a language analysis, the distinctiveness of a trade emblem is determined by its denominative and associative messages.
Purchasers look for unique emblems to identify particular sellers.
This allows purchasers to sort and store their personal experiences
with the product or service for use in later purchasing decisions.
Therefore, a language analysis supports Schechter's fundamental conclusion that preserving a trade emblem's capacity to distinguish con8
stitutes the main reason to afford legal protection.14
While the basic concepts are the same, Schechter's arguments in
favor of protecting the distinctiveness of marks differ in several respects from language analysis. Language analysis involves considerations that are not present in Schechter's reasoning. Once it is
recognized that trade emblems may contain an entire packet of information, the arguments in favor of antidilution laws lose much of their
persuasive force.
As demonstrated in Part I, two related considerations support exclusive rights in trade emblems. The first is the need to limit the purchaser confusion that might occur if multiple sellers use the same
identifying markers.149 Second, if a trade emblem acquires a strong

146.

147.

148.

149.

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872 (1992); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811
F.2d 26 (lst Cir. 1987).
The classic trademark case, Smith v. Chanel,Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968),
involved this sort of use. For a case discussing fair use in a context other than
comparative advertising, see New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
The statutes generally apply only to strong marks. For example, in Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied MechanicalTrades,Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977), the
court refused to protect the mark ALLIED under the New York antidilution statute because it concluded that the mark was not distinctive. Similarly, the new
federal antidilution law applies only to "famous" marks.
As discussed supra text accompanying notes 62 and 65, a language analysis supports trade emblem rights to protect the associative and denominative messages.
These messages together are roughly the same as Schechter's concept of
distinctiveness.
See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
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and clear associative message, a tremendous efficiency in communication can result. 5 0
A cause of action for blurring may satisfy the first criterion of
preventing deception, but only in some cases. A trade emblem loses
its significance when it ceases to convey a denominative message. Absent a denominative message, purchasers will fail to recognize that
the emblem indicates an identifiable source and therefore will be unable to use their past experiences with the emblem in deciding
whether to purchase. That inability to recall may injure purchasers if
their past experience with a product was largely negative because purchasers are more likely to try the unsatisfactory product again. On
the other hand, if past experience was generally positive, shoppers
will be less inclined to purchase the product if the emblem is no longer
distinctive. Although perhaps inefficient, the seller has no opportunity to use the trade emblem to deceive shoppers to their detriment.
In theory, a cause of action for blurring prevents deception only if
more purchasers have bad experiences with an emblem than positive
experiences. Even if this is true, providing a claim to these sellers
makes neither political nor practical sense. As a matter of policy, it is
difficult to justify creating a cause of action that would benefit only
sellers of low-quality products. Even if the cause of action existed, few
sellers would actually bring suit. The seller of low-quality goods may
it might erase purchasers'
in fact welcome dilution of its mark1 because
51
negative impressions of the goods.
Efficiency, the second rationale for protecting trade emblems, likewise does not support a cause of action for blurring. The antidilution
statutes generally apply only to marks with a well developed associative message. It is difficult to see how use of a strong mark on noncompeting goods could ever diminish a strong mark's associative
message.1 52 For example, shoppers' experiences with both DELTA
airlines and DELTA faucets are quite distinct, and the goodwill purchasers feel for one is not intertwined with the goodwill for the
other.153
150. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
151. In fact, a seller whose goods or services have developed a bad reputation often
will simply adopt a new trade emblem for those services on the theory that no
goodwill is better than negative goodwill. Dilution of that seller's existing trade
emblem would have the same effect.
152. The only situation where use on noncompeting goods could decrease strength is
where purchasers actually confuse the two sources. In this case, however, an
antidilution statute is unnecessary because the senior party can sue for
infringement.
153. In this respect, antidilution laws would make more sense if applied solely to weak
marks. Although there is little fear that strong marks will lose their associative
messages, weak marks often need help in acquiring that message. A purchaser
who encounters a new mark will develop an associative message more quickly if
no other seller-competing or noncompeting-can use the mark. This would al-
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The overall effect on competition is also an important consideration. A cause of action for dilution involves a trade-off. Even assuming that it protects one seller's goodwill, the cause of action prevents
other sellers from using the same mark to convey information concerning their commodities.15 4 In the case of competing goods, that
trade-off is acceptable because of the need to ensure that shoppers receive accurate information. The antidilution statutes, however, do not
require a showing that purchasers are receiving false information. In
effect, these statutes create a more expansive monopoly in a part of
the market vocabulary than that created by traditional trade emblem
law. Because this broader monopoly runs counter to the general policy that language is free for all to use, there are serious implications in
applying antidilution laws to situations of blurring.
Tarnishment, the second type of dilution, has been less widely accepted by the courts. The primary objections to tarnishment involve
significant free speech implications.155 These implications aside, a
language analysis actually provides more support for tarnishment
than for blurring.
The typical tarnishment case involves a defendant who uses a
trade emblem that, because of its similarity to the owner's, leads purchasers to think of the owner. 15 6 There is no likelihood of confusion in
the traditional sense, for everyone realizes that the defendant and the
owner are separate entities. However, because the defendant has
used the trade emblem in a context that causes shoppers to think less
favorably of the owner, there is a fear that the goodwill that the owner
has developed in the emblem will be diminished. Antidilution laws
attempt to preserve that goodwill.
A language analysis makes it clear that although blurring and
tarnishment both deal with goodwill in the general sense, each involves different aspects of the information conveyed by a trade emblem. Blurring involves a reduction in the strength of goodwill, which,
in the terminology of a language analysis, is the clarity of the associative message. Blurring affects the associative message by attacking it
at its foundation-the denominative message. If shoppers lose their
ability to use the mark to distinguish between sellers, shoppers cannot
invoke their experience when choosing among competing products in
the market.
low the purchaser to form a clear association between the new word and the personal experience that the purchaser will use to define the meaning of that word.

154. Of course, sellers are always free to use other marks. Again, however, that begs
the question. Giving exclusive rights in a word to any one person runs counter to
the general policy against monopolies in language. A monopoly is warranted only
if it will actually reduce deception.
155. For a discussion of these issues, see L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,Inc., 811
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
156. In many cases, the defendant will use a mark identical to the owner's.
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Tarnishment, on the other hand, deals with a loss in the positive
value of goodwill. This is the actual content of the associative
message. Although the mark is equally effective in causing shoppers
to think of the owner, the defendant's message has changed the shopper's overall impression of the owner for the worse. The defendant
affects that change quite subtly. Unlike infringement, the defendant
does not offer competing goods that shoppers confuse with the owner's.
Instead, the defendant's use of the mark in a tarnishment case sends
an allusive message to shoppers, which in turn affects the content of
the associative message. Many sellers use trade emblems that allude
to certain ideas to generate a favorable response to their commodities.
Similarly, a defendant's use of the owner's mark in the context of a
criticism or parody conveys ideas that purchasers may associate directly with the owner's product. These allusive messages may affect
purchaser goodwill, the overall impression that purchasers have of the
owner's product.
In this respect, tarnishment is closer to the law of false advertising
than the law of trade emblems. Once tarnishment is properly categorized, it is possible to take a reasoned approach to the serious free
speech concerns that surface in tarnishment cases. Any representation made by one party concerning another's goods or services can affect the seller's reputation regardless of whether it involves ordinary
speech or the use of trade emblems. The law may step in to protect
the seller's reputation when the representations are false. From this
perspective, tarnishment is an indirect form of trade libel. The difficult issues in a tarnishment case include (1) whether an allusive
message can be false and (2) whether purchasers actually rely on that
message in forming their goodwill for the products or services that are
the subject of the allusion. If both are satisfied, however, the cause of
action for tarnishment helps to ensure accurate communication.
The third variety of dilution, descriptive use, ordinarily is not recognized as a situation covered by the antidilution laws. Yet, from the
perspective of a language analysis, descriptive use poses possibly the
most serious threat to a mark's associative message. To illustrate,
suppose an ink manufacturer has developed a unique smear-proof ink
sold under the mark PEERLESS. Unless the manufacturer has obtained a patent, other companies are free to sell ink that is chemically
identical to PEERLESS. If those companies call their products
"PEERLESS-style ink" or "a perfect copy of PEERLESS ink,"' 5 7 purchasers may over time redefine the word PEERLESS as the descriptive name for smearless inks rather than smearless ink from a
particular source.

157. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Descriptive use poses a difficult issue because it involves two different tiers of communication. It is efficient if PEERLESS has a strong
associative message because shoppers can rely on their experiences as
an indication of expected quality. It is also efficient, however, if sellers
and shoppers have a single universal term to refer to a unique variety
of ink, the variety popularized by the original seller of PEERLESS.
This tension can be resolved only on a case-by-case basis by determining whether the need for uniform product names outweighs the efficiency offered by a strong trademark.
Overall, a language analysis offers varying degrees of support for
allowing a cause of action in the three varieties of dilution. Although
the answers are far from clear, the analysis is useful because it helps
identify the communication trade-offs involved in these laws. Courts
and legislatures need to consider these trade-offs, not just the plight of
the trademark owner, when dealing with the problem of dilution.
E. Succeeding to Trade Emblem Rights
Trade emblems often comprise a significant portion of a company's
assets. It is therefore not surprising that a purchaser of an ongoing
business is vitally interested in succeeding to the trade emblem rights
of the seller. Generally, the law accommodates the purchaser by allowing rights in trade emblems to be transferred. The only requirement is that the transfer cannot be "in gross," but instead must be
accompanied by a transfer of the goodwill connected with that emblem.15s As long as the successor continues to sell the same products
in the same markets, courts will honor the transfer of rights.
A language analysis supports this rule. As a practical matter, requiring the transfer of goodwill means that parties can convey emblems only when they also convey the means to produce a commodity
of equal quality.15 9 This rule prevents purchaser deception by maximizing the likelihood that the goods will continue to be the same qual0
ity that purchasers have come to associate with the trade emblem.16
In terms of language, requiring the transferee to purchase the means
of production helps preserve the accuracy of the associative message.
158. CHISuM & JACOBS, supra note 56, at 5-374 to 5-380.
159. Of course, marks that have not acquired goodwill are likely to be of little value
and are therefore rarely sold.
160. For some products, purchasers may be motivated mainly by the personal skills of

a person affiliated with the seller. Unless that person continues to work for the
successor, purchasers who buy in reliance on the trade emblem may be misled to
their detriment. These considerations may support the decision in Menendez v.
Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2nd Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom on other grounds, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), in which
the court held that owners of a Cuban cigar firm whose operations were seized by
the Cuban government nevertheless retained their rights to use the trademark,
notwithstanding that they were forced to use non-Cuban tobacco in their cigars.
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A language analysis also helps resolve some of the issues that can
arise in transfers. One particularly vexing issue is family names.
Many sellers have claimed the right to use their own name in connection with business activities, even though that name is owned by
someone else as a trade emblem. In some of these cases, the junior
claimants are the descendants of a transferor who previously owned
the emblem, but later conveyed the business and the emblem to a subsequent owner. Courts in these cases almost universally have decided
in favor of the transferee, although sometimes with extensive discus16
sions of the plight of the claimants who have lost their identity. 1
What makes the issue of family names troubling is the persistence
of the notion that a trade emblem is primarily an indication of source.
For example, it appears less misleading for the Smith family to use
the mark SMITH than it would be for some impersonal corporation to
do so. Yet, a language analysis reveals that the majority view is correct. Although a trade emblem identifies a source, the actual identity
of the source is usually unknown to the shopper. Shoppers want to
identify the source to incorporate their own experiences in choosing
among competing commodities. It is irrelevant whether the trade emblem is SMITH or some arbitrary word like GRYX, as both words are
capable of identifying a single source. 16 2 Therefore, because the actual successor to the original business is more likely to provide consistent quality, the law correctly affords it superior rights to someone
who simply has the fortune of bearing a name that is the same as a
famous mark.
A second problem arises in cases where there is no clear successor
in interest. Several cases deal with a partnership that has dissolved3
with each of the partners continuing in the same line of business.16
Because the partnership's trade emblems are well known to purchasers, each of the competing factions wants the exclusive right to use
those trade emblems in its business. These cases prove difficult only
because the courts proceed from the wrong paradigm. Here, the culprit is the urge to treat trade emblems as a form of "intellectual property," which must be allocated along with the other partnership
assets. Although treating a trade emblem as "property" may make
sense in some contexts, it creates problems in the context of a partner161. See, e.g., Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697 (7th

Cir. 1989); Taylor Wine Co., Inc. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731 (2nd
Cir. 1978); John T. Lloyd Labs., Inc. v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, 131 F.2d 703
(6th Cir. 1942).
162. Certain names, however, may by their very nature generate vague, but positive,
responses in consumers. These names are more valuable than a purely fanciful
term because of their allusive message.
163. See, e.g., Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc. v. White, Yankelovich, Skelly Consulting Group, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Perl Brand Foods
Corp. v. Deli Direct from Perl, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (N.D. IlM.1989).
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ship split. The purpose of granting exclusive rights in trade emblems
is not to reward the owner, but rather to ensure that shoppers receive
accurate and efficient information to guide them when shopping. As
such, the real goal in partnership split cases should be to reach a result that best ensures the accuracy of the trade emblem.
It will often be clear that one faction of the partnership was primarily responsible for the quality of the product. In those cases, that
faction is most likely to continue meeting purchasers' expectations.
Courts therefore should grant to that party exclusive rights because
allowing any of the other factions to use the trade emblem will likely
deceive purchasers.
On the other hand, it may be that none of the factions can produce
a similar product. In these cases, the best solution may be an outcome
that the courts generally do not consider-namely that none of the
factions should succeed to the original partnership's rights. Unlike
the partnership's other assets, the trade emblem rights would simply
disappear because none of the factions can use the emblem without
causing purchaser deception.' 6 4 Only in this fashion can the courts
prevent the sort of purchaser deception that should be central to the
law of trade emblems.165
F.

Reversing the Law's Priorities: The Problems of Reverse
Confusion and Reverse Passing Off

The traditional model of trade emblem law focuses on allocating
rights in a word, phrase, or symbol. One party, normally the senior
user, has the exclusive right to use that emblem on certain comodities. Sometimes, however, courts are asked to reverse these basic
principles. Many cases involve situations of "reverse confusion." In
these situations, shoppers identify more strongly with the junior than
164. The law of trade emblems would ordinarily respond to this type of situation by
declaring the trade emblem abandoned. For the reasons discussed supra text accompanying note 114, however, abandonment could lead to deception in this case.
165. Some of the more interesting cases of this genre involve groups of performing
artists who decide to dissociate. See, e.g., Grondin v. Rossington, 690 F. Supp.
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rick v. Buchansky, 609 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Rare

Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Noone v. Banner Talent Assoc., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); HEC Enterprises, Ltd. v. Deep
Purple, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 991 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See also Elizabeth Williams, Trademark Protection Under Lanham Act (15 USCS §§ 1501 et seq.) of
Name of Musical Group, 115 A.L.R. FED. 171 (1993). What makes these cases
special is the importance of personality to the success of a popular musical group.

Unlike most goods, purchasers of popular music identify quite strongly with the
various personae that comprise the group. To the extent that different members
of the group have this sort of personal draw, the "goodwill" that different pur-

chasers have in the original group may continue in different factions. This phenomenon presents the courts with the intractable problem of tracing this widely
varying goodwill to the different factions of the group.
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the senior user. Other courts have faced claims of "reverse passing
off." These cases involve both a junior and senior user who sell goods
from the exact same source, but use different marks. Both of these
problems of trademark law can benefit from a language analysis.
1.

Reverse Confusion

A language analysis supports the grant of exclusive rights in a
trade emblem to the senior user. Other factors being equal, it is most
likely that any associative message conveyed by that emblem will refer to the senior user simply because its commodity has been offered to
the public for a longer period of time. Other factors, however, often
are not equal. In many situations, a junior user will make a massive
investment in its commodity. If the senior user is relatively small,
purchasers quite possibly will develop an associative message in the
junior user's emblem rather than the senior user's. In several cases in
which this has occurred, the junior user has argued that this secondary meaning should preclude the senior user's infringement claim.
Courts generally have allowed the senior user to recover in these
cases. 16 6 They recognize that the likelihood of confusion is "reversed":
shoppers who see the trade emblem will assume that the products
come from the junior rather than the senior user. Nevertheless,
courts uphold the rights of the senior user on the theory that it would
be unfair for a large company to usurp the established rights of the
senior user merely by investing large sums in its own infringing
product.167

The law, however, should not grant exclusive rights to senior users
merely because of some vague sense of fairness. Instead, the main
concern should be the amount and accuracy of communication in the
marketplace. Granting recovery to the senior user will deceive purchasers insofar as they will receive an associative message that invokes their experiences with the products of the larger, junior firm.
Forcing the junior user to change its trade emblem will temporarily
disrupt market communication.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that courts are mistaken
in allowing senior users to recover for reverse confusion. Focusing
only on the case at hand is myopic. If one considers the situation as it
existed before the junior user adopted the emblem, it becomes apparent that allowing the junior user to usurp the rights of the senior is, in
166. See also Minnesota Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242

(8th Cir. 1994); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466 (3rd

Cir. 1994); Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 22 F.3d 1527 (9th Cr. 1994); Sands, Taylor & Wood, Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992).
167. Fisons Horticulture Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 475 (3rd Cir. 1994);
Banif, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2nd Cir. 1988).
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a sense, "unfair." The unfairness, however, is with respect to the
proper objects of trademark law-the purchasers of that commodity.
The large, junior user should certainly be allowed to compete in the
sale of the commodity. However, like any company hoping to enter the
market, the junior user could have selected any of a virtually infinite
supply of words or symbols for that commodity. If the junior user had
selected its own unique emblem, and purchasers developed an associative message in that emblem, the junior user would have increased the
efficiency of communication in the market by adding another clearly
defined trade emblem. On the other hand, if the junior user adopts
the same word or symbol as the senior user, a less-than-optimal
amount of communication will occur because there will be only one
new term where there could have been two. Some purchasers will be
confused regardless of which user develops secondary meaning. 168 A
better option is to force every junior user to adopt a distinct mark,
thereby increasing the number of potentially efficient trade
emblems.169

2. Reverse PassingOff
In the typical trademark infringement case, the defendant has
"passed off' its goods or services as that of the trademark owner by
employing a mark that is confusingly similar to the owner's. "Reverse
passing off," by contrast, occurs when the defendant sells goods, marketing the goods as his own, when the goods actually originate from
the same source as those sold by the trademark owner. 170 Although
many trademark owners do not mind if the same goods are sold under
a different name, others want the entire goodwill generated by the
product.171
168. In addition, a few purchasers may have started to develop a nascent associative

message referring to the senior user. Those purchasers will be confused if the
emblem now refers to another seller.
169. This analysis certainly supports a cause of action for reverse confusion in the case
where a junior user purposefully adopts an identical or confusingly similar emblem. The result may be different, however, when the junior user's infringement
was unintentional. The deterrence arguments are weaker in this situation. In
addition, allowing the senior user to prohibit use of the emblem will cause a significant, albeit temporary, disruption in market communication. The best way to
deal with these cases is for courts to make judicious use of their discretion in
granting injunctions. Instead of barring the junior user, the court could require it
to adopt a statement that distinguishes it from the senior user.
170. The doctrine of reverse passing off applies only to trademarks. It is difficult to
conceive of a situation where two sellers could sell the same service. Similarly, a
party could not engage in reverse passing off of a trade name.
171. A number of these cases have been brought by artists and authors, parties who
are understandably concerned with receiving credit. Waldman Publishing Corp.
v. Landoll Inc., 43 F.3d 775 (2nd Cir., 1994); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th
Cir. 1981)(holding that actor's complaint stated cause of action under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act when another actor was given credit for his work in a motion
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Courts have proven relatively sympathetic to claims of reverse
passing off.172 The perceived problem is not the sale of the goods itself, for absent a contractual restriction a retailer is generally free to
sell any products it can obtain. Rather, requiring the seller to use the
mark associated with the actual source ensures that any goodwill will
attach to the actual source.
A language analysis reveals that the standard arguments are too
simplistic. Cases of reverse passing off certainly involve purchaser
confusion because purchasers are ignorant of the "true" source's identity. Yet this alone is not a basis for recognizing a cause of action.
People generally do not buy products because of any affinity for the
person of the manufacturer. They instead buy certain goods and services because they hope that those goods and services will satisfy their
needs. Trademarks allow the identification that shoppers need to
make informed choices concerning competing commodities.
In a case of reverse passing off, the denominative message will exist regardless of what mark appears on the commodity.173 The only
possible problem is the associative message. If the true source is well
known to purchasers, its mark will convey a clear associative
message. Defendant's use of a different mark will not convey the same
information and therefore will deprive purchasers of the benefit of
their personal experiences with the true source.
It is difficult, however, to label this situation as "deceptive." A
shopper who has had no experience with the defendant's mark will
have no expectations for the product. That shopper will assume only
the base level of quality that is conveyed by the denominative
message, not any higher level that may come from experience. Admittedly, the defendant's use of a new mark is inefficient because it deprives purchasers of the benefit of experience. Yet, as long as they are
not deceiving purchasers, sellers are not required to make the most
efficient use of trademarks. A seller is free to change its mark at any
time, even if it has acquired a strong secondary meaning. Similarly, a
picture); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special Sch. Dist. No. 100, 666 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.
Ark. 1987)(holding author entitled to injunction where a book was published
without the author's name); Morita v. Omni Publications Intl. Ltd., 741 F. Supp.

1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
172. See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990). But see Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v.
Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1993Xfinding in favor of the defendant, but only because the products that the defendant sold were significantly different than those sold by the plaintiff). For a general discussion of reverse
passing off, including analysis of some of the cases, see William M. Borchard,
Reverse Passing Off-Commercial Robbery or Permissible Competition?, 67
TRADE RK REP. 1 (1977); Lori H. Freedman, Reverse PassingOff. A Great Deal

of Confusion, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1993).
173. The discussion in the text assumes the defendant has not chosen a mark that is
similar to some other seller's.
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seller is free to sell the same product under multiple trademarks.
These cases present the same likelihood of customer confusion as a
case of reverse passing off, and yet no liability results.174
Therefore, a language analysis suggests that a cause of action for
reverse passing off should not be recognized under the law of trade
emblems. Purchasers can never be injured by a mark without an associative message because the mark conveys no information to purchasers other than a denominative message. The cause of action also
presents serious difficulties even if the mark of the true source has
developed an associative message. Although inefficient, this situation
presents little opportunity for deception.
This does not mean that the owner should have no rights whatsoever in these cases. Other considerations outside of trade emblem law
may justify such a cause of action. Some courts have suggested, for
example, that "reverse passing off' really involves the complex and
controversial tort of "misappropriation."175 In cases involving artists,
a claim of reverse passing off might be justified as a form of the "moral
right" of paternity, a right that the United States is obligated to provide under the Berne Convention. 17 6 This Article merely suggests
174. There are certain rare cases in which purchaser deception will arise from reverse
passing off. One example is when a defendant's trade emblem has its own preexisting associative message that developed in connection with goods from a different source. If the defendant now changes to a new product line, purchasers will
be injured if the new product is not of the quality associated with defendant's
emblem. A separate cause of action for reverse passing off is unwarrrented in
this situation, however. Instead, the situation is merely a variation on the question of whether a trade emblem should be treated as creating an actionable "warranty," an issue discussed supra text accompanying notes 109-116.
Second, some sellers might choose not to use the mark of the true source in an
effort to mislead purchasers. If purchasers have had bad experiences with the
product and therefore have developed a negative associative message, a seller
may actually be better off using a new and unfamiliar mark. Many purchasers
will be more willing to take a chance on an unknown mark than to deal again
with a seller with whom they have had bad experiences. In this situation, denying shoppers their past experience may actually increase the possibility of injury.
However, unless the law is willing to prohibit all sellers from changing their
trade emblems to avoid their past, there is no clear reason to single out the defendant who engages in reverse passing off for such treatment.
175. Summit Machine Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Systems, Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1441
(9th Cir. 1993).
176. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised in Paris on July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. The
treaty requires signatory nations to supplement their copyright laws with additional authors' rights. The key section is Article 6bis:
ARmcLE 6bis

(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
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lawmakers need to recognize the problem for what it really is and not
use the law of trade emblems to accomplish ends for which it was not
designed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many consider trade emblem law to be narrow, technical, and
highly specialized. Although the rules may be difficult, the law of
trade emblems actually is concerned with the very important and
wide-ranging problem of language. Communication is crucial to most
of life's affairs, including the mundane day-to-day dealings that we
call the market. Because communication is costly, a market imperfection can result from inefficiency. Trade emblems improve efficient
market communication by allowing sellers to convey many different
ideas to purchasers in a short word, phrase, or image.
The law protects trade emblems because it recognizes their tremendous importance in facilitating efficient communication. Yet,
such communication is effective only if it is accurate. Although the
law has many means of ensuring accuracy in market speech, granting
exclusive rights to particular sellers is a useful way to enlist the aid of
private parties to police certain types of deception.
Nevertheless, legislators and courts have largely failed to recognize that the law of trade emblems forms a part of the broader question of communication. Lawmakers are more accustomed to dealing
with convenient labels, such as "property," than they are to forming a
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry
of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of
their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph
may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be
maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection
is claimed.
Id. The "right to claim authorship" is commonly known as the right of
"paternity."
The United States ratified the Berne Convention in 1988, and therefore is obligated by Article 6bis (3) to afford authors and artists a right of paternity. Congress' initial response, the Visual Artists' Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 106A, Stat. - (1990), does not provide such a right. This does not necessarily mean
that the United States has failed to meet its obligations. During the debates preceding the United States' accession to Berne, many of the opponents of the Convention claimed that Article 6bis would require major revisions of United States
law. To counter these claims, those favoring accession argued that the moral
rights were in practice not all that different than rights that authors already possessed under current United States law, in particular § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1976).
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law of language. Unless those who create the legal rules recognize the
broad implications those rules have for language, the resulting laws
may impair, rather than facilitate, accurate communication in the
market.
Fortunately, a review of the law of trade emblems from the perspective of language reveals that most of the basic principles are fundamentally sound. Problems begin to arise only when one approaches
the fringe issues of the law. It is telling that courts have often disagreed on these fringe issues, even when they approach the question
according to the standard doctrine. This suggests that the interrelationship between the law of trade emblems and language is intuitively
apparent, even if language considerations have not yet been a formal
part of the analysis.
In closing, this Article does not pretend to be the last word on the
question. The issues discussed constitute only a small portion of the
many issues in trade emblem law that might benefit from a language
analysis. The goal of the Article is to open a door to a new way of
thinking about trade emblem law and to provide a few illustrations of
how the approach might work. If this analysis is helpful, the principles of language can eventually assume their proper place in the law
of trade emblems.

